
GOD
355
Han/Can
106374
00106374


00106374

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019

# CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

GOD
355
Han/Can
106374

# CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

BY

COLONEL H. B. HANNA

LATE COMMANDING AT DELHI

AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"; "INDIAN PROBLEMS"; "CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?"; "INDIA'S SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER"; "BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS"; "THE DEFENCE OF INDIA'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER"; "A CAVALRY CATECHISM," ETC.

106374

"Give me *facts*, feed me on *facts*."
*Carlyle.*

"The Navy means for you your existence as an Empire; it means for you the fact that you are free from invasion; it means for you your daily food and daily employment. The Navy is all in all and everything; therefore, though the cost is great, it is little compared with what it brings back to you."

*Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty in the late Government.*

"What is the real basis and justification of the craven fears which threaten to burden this country with a sort of conscript army, which threaten to turn this country into a sort of Germany, with its millions of soldiers, and which threaten to lose us even a sort of command of the sea, for we cannot serve two masters?"

*Archibald Hurd, Author of "The Command of the Sea."*

LX-C-47

METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON

*Third Edition*

B. B. TARAPOREVALA, SONS & CO., BOMBAY.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

*First published October 1912*

# CONTENTS


| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| I. | GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION AND SOURCES OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH. | 1 |
| II. | STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS . . . . . | 10 |
| III. | THE INVASION SCARE . . . . . | 35 |
| IV. | CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE: TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY . . . . . | 60 |
| V. | THE SHIPPING PROBLEM . . . . . | 82 |
| VI. | MOBILISATION: CONCENTRATION: EMBARKATION . . . . . | 96 |
| VII. | VOYAGE: DISEMBARKATION: AND—AFTER . | 112 |
| VIII. | CONCLUSION . . . . . | 136 |
| INDEX | . . . . . | 145 |

# Can Germany Invade England?

## CHAPTER I

### GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION AND SOURCES OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH

"This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands;
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England!"

SHAKESPEARE.

"Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."

SIR WALTER RALEIGH.

"Without a well-appointed and commanding Navy, the British Army and the lofty spirit of Britons would be confined to their own shores at home, and become powerless and unknown abroad; their commerce would fall into decay and pass into other hands, and we should be once more reproached as the Britain *toto ab orbe exclusa*, instead of as now respected in every part of the world."—*Life of Admiral Lord Howe.*

SET in the heart of stormy seas, often

difficult to navigate, often enshrouded in mist, the United Kingdom lies athwart the principal water-routes of the world, not only those which connect Europe with Canada, the United States, and the West Indies, but equally those which bring to the Northern European States the products of Africa, South America, India, China, Australia, and Japan; and, so long as she commands the English Channel and the North Sea, it will be in her power to seal up the navies and mercantile fleets of any of her neighbours—Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Northern Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and those of Northern France.

And if Great Britain's geographical position is unique, her resources for defence surpass those of her most powerful competitors. Small in extent, she is yet one of the strongest countries in the world: strong in the industry and ingenuity of her

inhabitants; in her immense coal and iron-fields; in her numerous navigable rivers; in her many fine harbours; in her great fishing industry, which, whilst giving employment to thousands and food to millions of her people, provides skilled and hardy sailors for her national and mercantile marine; strong in her splendid dockyards, in which, thanks to Free Trade, she builds more quickly and cheaply than all other States, with the natural consequence that she builds not only for herself but for the world. In her private dockyards, foreign men-of-war are always on the stocks, ships which on the breaking out of hostilities would go, at once, to swell the British Navy; in her public dockyards, Dreadnoughts and cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are ever under construction or repair; and well-stocked arsenals, in positions carefully selected and fortified against attack from the sea, stand ready to equip and

victual new marine monsters, or renew the equipment and supplies of old ones. And because Free-Trade Britain has become the rendezvous of the world's shipping, the distributing centre of the world's wealth, she is strong in the self-interest of all other countries, for which among them can desire the dislocation or even temporary interruption of this inflow and outflow of the world's trade? Certainly not Germany, the volume of whose yearly exchanges with her amounts to over a hundred millions sterling.

Still, since history presents many instances of Governments acting in opposition to the true interests of their subjects, and others, hardly less numerous, of individuals or classes working on the passions and fears of the bulk of the people to bring about a war by which they hope to profit, it is incumbent on Great Britain not to trust too confidently to the enlightened self-interest of other nations, and, therefore,

necessary that she should possess and maintain, in the highest possible state of efficiency, the Navy by which she can take full advantage of her incomparable natural position, necessary, too, that that Navy should be scientifically distributed, *i.e.* in accord with the principles of strategy.

In the next chapter it will be shown that Great Britain does possess such a Navy, and that it is judiciously distributed. In order, however, that the lay reader may be able to follow the facts and figures that will be laid before him, and to understand the conclusions drawn from them, he should know in what the principles of strategy consist, and be acquainted with a concrete example of their application to naval warfare.

No better definition of strategy can be given than that contained in a single sentence of a letter written by Napoleon to his brother Joseph: "There is a great

difference between operations conducted on a well-considered system from an organised centre, and proceeding at haphazard without such centre, and risking the loss of one's communications."

In these few words the great master of the science and art of war described both the true strategy and the false; and the long, fierce struggle between the English and the Dutch in the seventeenth century affords a perfect demonstration of both. So long as England conducted that war "on a well-considered system from an organised centre" in the English Channel, thus severing Holland's communications with the outer world, including her own colonies, she paralysed the action of the Dutch Fleet, and maintained her own supremacy on the sea[1];

[1] "The opinion of Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobisher and others, that be men of greatest judgment [and] experience, is that [the] surest way to meet the Spanish Fleet is upon their own [coast] or in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them."—*Lord Howard of Effingham to Sir Francis Walsingham, June* 14, 1588.

but when, against the warnings of her Admirals, she laid up her battleships and "proceeded at haphazard, without such a centre," thus "risking the loss of her communications," to disperse her frigates to prey upon the enemy's merchant shipping,[1] she lost that supremacy with consequences disastrous and disgraceful to herself. A Dutch fleet under de Ruyter appeared in the Nore, advanced unopposed up

[1] "This form of strategy is termed 'commerce destroying'—a great misnomer; for it is precisely the result which is not secured by the methods adopted. . . . It is a cheap method of making war, and, to all but those who probe to the root of matters, specious; hence adherents to its doctrines are always to be found."—Gold Medal Prize Essay for 1908, "The Command of the Sea: What is it?" by Major A. B. N. Churchill, *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, April 1909.

Admiral Mahan also condemns "commerce destroying" in his great work, *Influence of Sea Power on History*. And General Bronsart von Schellendorff, in his *Duties of the General Staff of the German Army*, p. 552, writes: "A fleet which endeavoured to carry out its duties by destroying the enemy's commerce without considering the general situation would violate the most important principle of strategy—that the main force should be kept concentrated to deal with the most dangerous opponent."

the Thames to Gravesend, forced the boom which protected the Medway, and captured sixteen British vessels, including the famous *Royal Charles*, the pick of the English Fleet, and towed her to Holland.[1]

Holland owed her temporary triumph entirely to Great Britain's blunders, her final and permanent discomfiture to the latter country's natural strategic superiority; nothing therefore but a repetition of the same blunders on a magnified scale, under conditions which render them practically unthinkable, can assure to Germany so much as the chance of emerging victorious from a struggle with this country, for is not her strategical position worse than Holland's, her coast-line shorter, her harbourage more limited, her communications with the outer world longer and more open

[1] *The Story of the British Navy*, by E. Keble Chatterton, pp. 213, 214.

to attack; and is not the disparity between her fleet and ours to-day far greater than the disparity between the Dutch and the English Fleets two hundred and fifty years ago?

# CHAPTER II

## STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

"The recent activity of the invasion-monger, in spite of the fact that, relatively and absolutely, the Royal Navy is now stronger than at any period of its wonderful history, is an unhealthy symptom."—SIR GEORGE SYDENHAM CLARKE, G.C.M.G., *Governor of Bombay, late Secretary of the Defence Committee.*

"As to the present position of the British Fleet, there is no possibility of cavil. It is extremely easy to produce sophisticated statistics to prove almost anything, but it will be impossible for any alarmist to paint a picture of naval peril at present from the materials at command."—ARCHIBALD HURD.

"As about 42,000 men are required to man the active fleet, and about 7,000 of the nominal personnel are not available for purposes of war, it follows that Germany, having to exchange 15,000 men under training for trained men, could not mobilise her fleet without calling out the reserve—an important point when we are asked to believe in the possibility of a surprise attack."—GERARD FIENNES.

"For this, at least, I thank Heaven devoutly; the hegemony of the wider seas is vested, as always, in ships-of-the-Line, and when I note our position to-day (a greater ratio of superiority as against other nations than ever known before!), and review our position in the future—why, I sleep right soundly in my bed."—ALAN H. BURGOYNE, M.P., *Editor of the "Navy League Annual."*

I SHALL now lay before my readers a number

of facts and figures which will, I think, convince them that so far from Germany's being in a position to invade England, her fleet, should there ever be war between the two countries, would scarcely dare to weigh anchor and venture out into the open sea.

So recently as six years ago dissemination, as opposed to concentration, was Great Britain's Naval policy. Her ships-of-war were "scattered here and there as with a pepper-box" [1]; but, in 1906, Lord Fisher put an end to this haphazard state of things, and to-day we are literally in a position to talk with the enemy in our gates.

[1] "All these small detachments scattered here and there as with a pepper-box are common devices, but are dangerous, and proofs of extreme ignorance in military matters."—*Indian Misgovernment*, by Sir Charles Napier, p. 408.

Sir C. Napier's remarks are as applicable to the Navy as to the Army.—H. B. H.

TABLE I[1]

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4th Squadron of the 1st Fleet: | | |
| Battleships . . . | 6 | |
| Armoured Cruisers 4 | 8 | No German Fleet. |
| Protected Cruisers 4 | | |
| Destroyers . . . | 10 | |

A new squadron, consisting of four cruiser-battleships and two armoured cruisers, is eventually to be based on Malta, a great *place d'armes*, in whose well-protected harbour all requisites for docking, repairing, and refitting the largest men-of-war are provided. The Torpedo-boat Destroyer Flotilla is to be increased next winter to thirty destroyers, a new base for small craft is to be formed at Alexandria, and a squadron of six battleships is to be based on Gibraltar, which is also a first-class naval harbour. This squadron is, in time, to be increased to eight battleships. The criticisms levelled against these changes are undeserved. A great naval base at Gibraltar will ensure our communications with India

[1] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 71.

in the event of the route through the Suez Canal being interrupted; and a battle squadron permanently located at the entrance to the Mediterranean, a "fertile area," where "trade tends to be crowded,"[1] will be well placed either for the purpose of reinforcing the Cruiser Squadron at Malta or the British Fleets in the Home waters, which, in their turn, can at any moment spare ample vessels to make the Mediterranean Fleet superior to any possible combination against it.

TABLE II[2]

ATLANTIC OCEAN (IRISH WATERS)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Squadron of the 1st Fleet: | | | |
| Battleships . . . | 6 | | |
| Armoured Cruisers | 4 | 7 | No German Fleet. |
| Protected Cruisers | 3 | | |

The Atlantic Fleet is in future to be based on home ports instead of Gibraltar, and is to be brought up during the year from six to eight battleships.

[1] See "Attack and Defence of Trade" in *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p. 263, by Julian S. Corbett, LL.M.

[2] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 71.

## TABLE IIIA

IN HOME WATERS

*British Fleet*

| In the English Channel | | In the North Sea [2] | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in commission with nucleus crews)[1] | | 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet (Fully manned) | |
| Battleships . . | 11 | Battleships . . | 25 |
| Armoured Cruisers | 9 | Battle Cruisers . | 5 |
| Protected Cruisers | 10 | | 30 |
| | 19 | Armoured Cruisers | 13 |
| 8th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in reserve with skeleton, or maintenance, crews)[3] | | Protected Cruisers | 16 |
| | | | 29 |
| Battleships . . . | 4 | Scouts . | 8 |
| Protected Cruisers . | 11 | | |

Eventually the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet will each consist of eight battleships with full complements of active service ratings. The 7th Squadron, 3rd Fleet, will be manned by a nucleus crew, and on mobilisation brought up to full strength by a new force to be called the "Immediate Reserve." The 8th Squadron will only be a reserve manned by skeleton, or maintenance, crews.

Destroyer flotillas in support of 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons, 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, 2nd Fleet, based on:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rosyth (1st) . | 20 | Harwich (5th) . | 26 |
| „ (2nd) . | 16 | Portsmouth (6th) | 23 |
| „ (8th) . | 24 | Portland (4th) . | 16 |
| Harwich (3rd) . | 16 | Devonport (7th) | 24—165 |

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Flotillas are driven by turbines, and not one has been launched more than five years.

| | |
|---|---|
| In full Commission . . . . | 68 |
| In reserve with nucleus crews . . | 97—165 |

[1] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 70.

[2] *Ibid.* 1912, p. 71.

[3] *Ibid.* 1911, p. 9.

(*Continued on page* 16)

## TABLE IIIB

### IN GERMAN WATERS

*German Fleet*

| In Baltic Sea[1] | | In North Sea[1] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In Reserve | | 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet | | |
| Battleships | 4 | Battleships | 17 | 19 |
| Protected Cruisers | 2 | Battle Cruisers | 2 | |
| Destroyers | 12 | Armoured Cruisers | 1 | 6 |
| | | Protected Cruisers | 5 | |
| | | Destroyers | 24 | |
| | | In Reserve | | |
| | | Battleships | 4 | |

Destroyer Flotilla in support of the High Sea Fleet:

Based on Wilhelmshaven . . . 24

„ „ Kiel in Baltic (in reserve) . 12—36

Note.—Of the 30 English Battleships and Battle Cruisers in the North Sea, three are armed with 13·5-inch guns, the remainder with 12-inch; whereas of Germany's 19, three are armed with 12-inch guns, the remainder with only 11-inch, which gives to Great Britain a great superiority in weight of metal.[2]

[1] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 71.

[2] *Fleets* (Great Britain and Foreign Countries) 127, May, 1912.

(*Continued on page* 17)

Abstract of British Fleets in the Home and Irish Waters (see Tables II and IIIA):

| | |
|---|---|
| Battleships, including Battle Cruisers | 51 |
| Armoured Cruisers | 26 |
| Protected Cruisers | 40 |
| Scouts | 8 |
| Destroyers | 165 |
| Total number of vessels in Home and Irish Waters when all are mobilised | 290 |

A little over 18,000 men are sufficient at present to complete the crews of the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet to full commission.[1] These vessels are fully provisioned, and ammunition, stores, and coal laid in. The crews who are on shore ready to embark, can be shipped in a few hours.

A "nucleus crew consists of everything required to manage a ship, and to fight a ship, excepting only what may be described as the unskilled maritime labour required for the purpose. These nucleus crews take out their ship. They practise the guns of their ship; they are not liable to those inevitable breakdowns which people changing to new machinery for the first time always experience."[2]

A skeleton, or maintenance, crew consists of everything necessary to keep the ship, machinery, and guns in perfect order.

Two cruisers of exceptionally high speed are attached to the Destroyer Flotilla. The eight scouts (small fast cruisers) act as "mother" or depôt ships to the destroyers.[3]

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 1st Fleet and 5th and 6th Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet are at present based on Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet on Dover. When completed, Rosyth will form another base for the Fleet in the North Sea.

[1] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 71.
[2] Mr. Balfour at Glasgow on January 12, 1905.
[3] Sir William White, late Director of Naval Construction, in *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1911.

Abstract of the German High Sea Fleet in the North Sea, including Reserves in that Sea and the Baltic (see Table IIIB):

| | |
|---|---|
| Battleships, including Battle Cruisers | 27 |
| Armoured Cruisers | 1 |
| Protected Cruisers | 7 |
| Destroyers | 36 |
| Total number of vessels in North Sea and Baltic Sea when all are mobilised | 71 |

Germany's High Sea Fleet is based on Wilhelmshaven, and her ships in the Baltic on Kiel. The canal which connects the Baltic Sea with the River Elbe is about sixty-two miles long, and at the prescribed speed of 5·3 knots per hour it would take a ship thirteen hours to get through it.[1] Its channel is, at present, too shallow to allow of the passage of ships of the Dreadnought type, but the work of deepening the canal is going on, and will probably be completed in 1915.[2] The alternative route from the Baltic by the Little and Great Belts, the Kattegat and Skager Rák, is from 600 to 700 miles long; in winter often infested by ice, and at all seasons dangerous, owing to dense fogs which prevail in these shallow and contracted waters.

[1] Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P., Editor of the *Navy League Annual*.

[2] Sir William White in *Nineteenth Century* for July 1911.

The following table sets forth the total strength of the Navies of Great Britain and Germany:

TABLE IV

Comparative strength of the two Navies (omitting Battleships and Armoured Cruisers over 20 years old).

| Great Britain | | | Germany | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battleships | 55 | 60 | Battleships | 33 | 35 |
| Battle Cruisers | 5 | | Battle Cruisers | 2 | |
| Armoured Cruisers | | 34 | Armoured Cruisers | | 9 |
| Protected Cruisers I. | 18 | 72 | Protected Cruisers I. | 6 | 37 |
| " " II. | 38 | | " " II. | 26 | |
| " " III. | 16 | | " " III. | 11 | |
| Unprotected Cruisers | | 5 | Unprotected Cruisers | | 6 |
| Scouts | 8 | 387 | Destroyers | 109 | 202 |
| Torpedo Vessels | 26 | | Torpedo Boats | 80 | |
| Destroyers | 179 | | Submarines | 13 | |
| Torpedo Boats | 109 | | | | |
| Submarines | 65 | | | | |
| Grand total | | 558 | Grand total | | 289 |

There are some battleships over twenty years old still appearing in England's and Germany's Naval Lists; and in these so-called obsolete vessels Great Britain is also much stronger than Germany.[1]

[1] Lord Brassey, at page 8 of *The Naval Annual* for 1912, writes: "It has been a wise policy, largely due to the initiative of Lord Fisher, to put out of the dockyards vessels

Referring to the obsolescence of men-of-war, Mahan, in his latest work on *Naval Strategy*,[1] writes: "The last expression of foreign professional opinion, concerning these so-called obsolete ships, is that, in the later stages of a war, when the newest ships have undergone their wear and received their hammering, the nation which then can put forward the largest reserve of ships of the older types will win."

Tables I and II show that, whereas Great Britain has twenty-four big and little vessels in the Mediterranean and six battleships and seven cruisers in the Atlantic (Irish waters), Germany has not a single vessel in either;

hopelessly inefficient for every service"; but he adds: "The policy may be carried too far." Eleven battleships of the Japanese Navy "are similar in armament, protection, and speed to the battleships we have lately sold at nominal prices, . . . all of large dimensions, powerfully armed, of good speed, with ample coal [space], and in sound condition." See also his remarks, at p. 9, regarding the hasty scrapping of cruisers.

[1] *Naval Strategy*, p. 7, by Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy.

and Table III shows that, leaving the Channel Fleet out of account and Germany's small reserves in the North and Baltic Seas, Great Britain's North Sea Fleet is numerically much stronger than Germany's High Sea Fleet. These, in themselves, are reassuring facts; but their value is greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the British ships are much larger than the German ships, as will be seen in the following table:

TABLE V

DISPLACEMENT IN TONS OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS OF FLEETS IN NORTH SEA

(See Table IIIA)

| | |
|---|---|
| Great Britain's 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet . | 539,450 tons. |

(See Table IIIB)

| | |
|---|---|
| Germany's 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet . . . | 313,600 ,, |
| In favour of Great Britain . | 225,850 ,, |

AVERAGE TONNAGE OF SINGLE SHIPS

| | |
|---|---|
| Great Britain . . . . . | 17,982 ,, |
| Germany . . . . . | 16,506 ,, |
| In favour of Great Britain . | 1,476 ,, |

As, however, a ship is merely a floating platform for the transport of men and guns to the scene of battle, and the displacement of this floating platform is the measure of its carrying capacity, it follows that the British Fleet in the North Sea can bring to the scene of battle a much more powerful armament than is carried by the German High Sea Fleet. Now, the broadside fire of their battleship armament is the true test of the fighting power of men-of-war, and, in this respect also, Great Britain's superiority to Germany is overwhelming, as shown in the table below :

TABLE VI[1]

BROADSIDE FIRE OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS IN NORTH SEA

| | |
|---|---|
| Great Britain . . . . . | 230,726 lb. |
| Germany . . . . . | 131,700 ,, |
| Great Britain's superiority . | 99,026 ,, |

[1] *Fleets* (Great Britain and Foreign Countries), May 1912, No. 127.

AVERAGE BROADSIDE FIRE OF THE SHIPS TAKEN SINGLY

| | |
|---|---|
| Great Britain . . . . . | 7,690 lb. |
| Germany . . . . . | 6,935 „ |
| Great Britain's superiority . . | 755 „ |

Or, in a fleet of thirty battleships, practically equivalent to three extra men-of-war.

The preponderance in weight of the broadside fire of the British cruisers in the North Sea as compared with that of the German cruisers in the same sea is even more marked, as Great Britain has twenty-nine cruisers, thirteen of which are armoured, as against Germany's six, only one of which is armoured. Here again Germany is out-numbered and out-classed by Great Britain.

Since ships-of-war cannot be always at sea and are liable to accident and deterioration, the next point to be considered and compared is the docking accommodation possessed by each nation.

## TABLE VII

DOCKYARDS FOR DREADNOUGHTS AND KINDRED CLASSES

*In Use* [1]

| | Great Britain | Germany |
|---|---|---|
| In Home Waters | 29 | 11 |
| Abroad | 15 | 0 |
| Total | 44 | 11 |

*Building and Projected in Home Waters* [2]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Building | 8 | 2 |
| Projected | 3 | 1 |
| Total | 11 | 3 |

*Abroad*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Building | 3 | 0 |
| Projected | 2 | 0 |
| Total | 5 | 0 |

Grand Total

Great Britain . . 60 Germany . . 14

This is a very satisfactory state of things, and our position in regard to docks capable of taking ships of ever-increasing size is no less satisfactory. Two floating

[1] *The Ocean Empire*, pp. 111, 112, by Gerard Fiennes.

[2] *The Navy League Annual* for 1911-12, Table X, p. 278, by Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P.

docks suitable for the largest vessels that at present exist will be completed in a few months—one for the Medway and the other for Portsmouth. Early in 1913 a new dock will be available at Portsmouth, another in January 1914; and three docks and the lock at Rosyth in 1916. There are also five private docks which could be used for the largest vessels, and two more are building.[1]

### *Mercantile Auxiliaries*

The difference between the size, speed, and number of the British merchant-men that could be used as cruisers or scouts in time of war and the German merchant ships that might be similarly employed is as great, and as much to the advantage of the former marine, as the difference which has been shown to exist between the British and the German Navies.

[1] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 33.

TABLE VIII[1]

| Tonnage | Great Britain Number of Ships | Germany Number of Ships |
|---|---|---|
| 2,000 and under 3,000 | 830 | 140 |
| 3,000 „ „ 4,000 | 1,198 | 59 |
| 4,000 „ „ 5,000 | 773 | 109 |
| 5,000 „ „ 7,000 | 420 | 110 |
| 7,000 „ „ 10,000 | 201 | 40 |
| 10,000 „ „ 12,000 | 57 | 12 |
| 12,000 „ „ 15,000 | 37 | 10 |
| 15,000 „ „ 20,000 | 6 | 7 |
| 20,000 „ „ 25,000 | 4 | 1 |
| 25,000 „ „ 30,000 | — | 1 |
| 30,000 „ „ 40,000 | 2 | — |
| 40,000 and above | 1 | — |
| Total | 3,529 | 489 |

So far, however, the Admiralty has refused to subsidise any merchant vessel with a speed of less than 22 knots, on the ground that, unless their speed is much above that of the enemy's fastest cruisers,

[1] *Lloyd's Register of Shipping* for 1912, Table V, vol. ii. p. 920. The largest steamer in the world is the *Olympic*, a British steamer, registering 45,324 tons; the largest German steamer is the *George Washington*, 25,570 tons; but Germany is building a vessel considerably larger than the *Titanic*, recently lost in the Atlantic.—H. B. H.

they must, in course of time, suffer capture; and as only the *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, and a few other vessels of the Cunard Company attain this speed, only steamers of that line have been accepted as auxiliaries to the Navy. It is possible, however, that the Admiralty may reconsider this decision, for, as Sir William White has pointed out, very few of the great cruiser-battleships recently built can maintain a sea-speed approaching 25 knots, in moderate weather, for any length of time.[1]

Germany has also subsidised some of her swiftest merchant vessels; and it has been reported, but not confirmed, that they habitually carry their armaments in their holds, ready, at any moment, to exchange a peaceful for a warlike status.[2] If true, this report need cause British shipowners

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1911.

[2] The Australian Government "are doing their utmost to ascertain whether foreign ships were really equipped for immediate conversion into commerce destroyers"; but the Chairman of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, trading with Australia, characterised the statement "as a ridiculous

little alarm, for, as Germany has no naval bases and only two coaling-stations outside her own waters,[1] such transformed vessels would soon run short of fuel, and, with the English Channel shut against them, would fall a prey to the British cruisers which would be on their track. A similar fate must, in the end, overtake any of Germany's regular cruisers that might happen to be at large on the ocean routes when war was declared, though, for a time, they might cause some loss and a great deal of annoyance to our shippers and insurance companies.

## *The Soul of a Ship*

Having dealt with the ships of the two Fleets under comparison, I come now to the crews, without whose hands, eyes, and intelligence to navigate the hulls, set and

one, for which there was neither excuse nor justification."—*Morning Post*, October 21, 1911.

[1] At Kamaran I. in the Red Sea and Swakop in the Atlantic, which, in the event of war, would at once be captured.—H. B. H.

keep the machinery in motion, and load and fire the guns, the finest ship in the world is but so much dead matter, fit only for the scrap-heap[1]; and here too Great Britain's numerical strength is far in excess of that of Germany or any other nation.

## TABLE IX

PERSONNEL OF THE TWO NAVIES

| | Men on Active Service | Reserve | Length of Service |
|---|---|---|---|
| Great Britain | 134,000[2] | 57,904[3] | 12 years[4] |
| Germany | 60,805[2] | 110,000[4] | 3 years[4,5] |

[1] "The one abiding lesson of every great naval victory, from Salamis to Tsu-Shima, is that men are more than material; and the mistaken inferences drawn from them are mainly due to forgetfulness of the fact."—*The Ocean Empire*, p. 95.

[2] *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1912, p. 467. The Naval Estimates of both countries for this year make provision for an increase in their active service lists, when "we should have a total personnel of 137,500 as against Germany's 66,783, giving us a preponderance of more than two to one" (Parliamentary Debate on the Defence of the Empire, reported by *The Morning Post* of July 27, 1912).

[3] Navy Estimates, 1912-13. Statement of the First Lord [Cd. 6106].

[4] *The Ocean Empire*, p. 96, by Gerard Fiennes.

[5] "Five years are required to train a really efficient seaman, and while he is being trained he is necessarily a weak element in a fighting service."—LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.

British Bluejackets and Marines are drawn principally from a seafaring stock, and are enlisted, on a voluntary system, for twelve years, at the end of which they are eligible for re-engagement for a second term of ten years, completion of which entitles them to a pension.[1] Two-thirds of Germany's sailors are conscripts enrolled for three years, the greater proportion of whom have never seen the sea,[2] and are looked upon rather as "soldiers on board ship than seamen."[3]

Germany's short-service system accounts for the large number of her reservists. If England adopted the same system, her Reserve would be immense; but she has no need to increase it, since her active-

[1] *The Ocean Empire*, p. 97.

[2] "Early in October the [German] Fleet will lose at least one-fourth of its trained men, their places being taken by a like number of raw recruits, most of whom have never before set foot on shipboard."—German Naval Notes from *The Navy's* Own Correspondent, see Number for October 1911, p. 269.

[3] *The Ocean Empire*, p. 101.

service personnel, trained from boyhood to middle-age on the sea, is sufficient to man the whole of her war-Navy,[1] whereas the German High Sea Fleet is under the necessity of changing one-third of its personnel every year, with the result that the sea-going fleet is always more or less of a training squadron; and when it goes to sea for its first cruise in May, it is hardly in condition to fight without returning to exchange its contingent of recruits for trained reservists.[2]

[1] "The active-service personnel is, however, sufficient to man the whole of our war-Navy, and that is not the case with any foreign Power."—*The Ocean Empire*, p. 98.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 100, 101.

"It is declared [so writes Captain von Pustau in the *Tägliche Rundschau*] that our men are better trained, or even more courageous, than the British. This assumption is entirely without foundation; on the contrary, every one who has seen British seamen at work knows that they represent the very best stock and type of their race, and will have remarked that, under the influence of glorious traditions handed down from a period of continued brilliant triumphs, these men have acquired a boundless self-confidence, an independent bearing, and a recklessness

I have now shown: (1) That England has in her Home and Atlantic Fleets 51 line-of-battleships against Germany's 27 in the Baltic and North Sea; 66 cruisers as against 8, and 165 destroyers as against 36, besides having a very serviceable active fleet in the Mediterranean. (2) That the superiority of the broadside fire of the British line-of-battleships to the broadside fire of the German line is about 3 to 2, and the superiority of her active-service personnel is over 2 to 1. (3) That the strategical position with which Nature has endowed her has been taken such full advantage of since 1906 that, in case of war breaking out between the two countries, not a single German man-of-war, not a single German merchant ship, not a single German fishing-

approaching brutality—all of them characteristics which may very often bring decisive victory in naval warfare, as surely as the best military discipline and training."—German View of the British Seaman, see *The Navy* for October 1911, p. 268.

smack, could leave or enter a German port, and her ocean-borne trade would cease to exist.

This is no idle boast, and certainly it carries with it no desire on my part to see its fulfilment—the more peaceful German ships there are on the world's waters the better for the world, England included—but facts are facts, and it is well for the peoples of both countries to know them. There are only two ways out of the North Sea—one round the north of Scotland, the other through the English Channel. If the German Fleet tried to break through by the former, it would meet the British Atlantic Fleet, reinforced by the Channel Fleet, and be attacked in rear and in flank by the North Sea Fleet. Even if, by some ruse on their part or some negligence on ours, German men-of-war did reach the Atlantic, what could they do there, with no ports and only two coaling-stations to resort to,

and the British Fleets that they had eluded in full chase? And, of course, an attempt to force a passage through the English Channel would be a still more hopeless undertaking, for that Channel is like unto a well-guarded, formidable mountain pass held by a superior force—a position which no prudent soldier would attempt to capture by direct attack, but would try to turn; and whereas there are few positions on land that cannot be outflanked, there is no possibility of turning the English Channel, and direct attack, in this case, would mean engaging the North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic Fleets, with the Mediterranean Fleet, called up by wireless telegraphy, hurrying north to pounce upon any vessel that might chance to reach the Bay of Biscay.

Again I repeat—Nature has given to Great Britain a position which carries with it supremacy of the sea; and it is of no use for Germany to try to wrest that supremacy

from her, because it is rooted in a natural advantage of which she cannot be deprived. It was Great Britain's position which enabled her to reduce Holland from a first-class to a third-class Power, without once landing an army on her shores, though the Dutch ships were as numerous, as well manned, and as well fought as the English; and Great Britain's position would tell in exactly the same way, and with greater force, in her favour in a war with Germany—a war which for that very reason is never likely to be declared.

# CHAPTER III

## THE INVASION SCARE

"I always said that whilst we had a Fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt."—LORD TORRINGTON, *First Lord of the Admiralty in* 1727.

"We have endeavoured to picture to ourselves a clear issue which is very unfavourable to this country, and have shown, at least to our satisfaction, that on that hypothesis, unfavourable as it is, serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which we need seriously consider."—MR. BALFOUR.

"Modern history does not afford a single instance of a successful invasion of this country, because our Navy has always stood directly in the path of the would-be invader."—ADMIRAL SIR VESEY HAMILTON, G.C.B.

THE facts and figures presented in the foregoing chapters ought to convince all thinking men of the baselessness of the expectation that, at some indefinite time, for some indefinite cause, the German Government will suddenly embark upon the most venturesome of enterprises—the invasion of this country.

Unfortunately, there are persons who do not think, but just pin their faith on the *dicta* of some man, to whom they attribute special knowledge or special foresight; it will, therefore, still be necessary to ascertain who to-day is playing the part of the blind leader of the blind, and then to array against his *dicta* the testimony of the large number of military and naval experts who differ from him, first, however, sweeping away a traditional error, which has contributed not a little to that sense of insecurity which it is my object to dispel.

There is a very general belief that, at a time when a huge flotilla was waiting at Boulogne to carry a hundred and fifty thousand French soldiers across the Channel, England's greatest Admiral, deluded by false reports, sailed to the West Indies, leaving his country defenceless, save for such resistance as her small Army could offer to the invaders. I will not stop to prove that the conditions under which it was possible to

deceive Nelson as to the whereabouts of the combined French and Spanish Fleet, have given place to conditions under which it is next door to impossible to conceal the movements of vessels in any part of the world, but content myself with affirming that, in sailing away, Nelson left behind him a fleet capable of holding the Channel against any force that might be brought against it, and in the teeth of which no transports would venture to put to sea. Wherever the bulk of Napoleon's Navy might be, he knew that its total strength was eighty men-of-war, and those eighty too scattered to be capable of rapid concentration, whereas Great Britain had sixty ships of the line and as many, or more, frigates, so disposed that, at short notice, they could be brought together in the Straits of Dover.[1] Consequently, England was not, at this juncture, any more than

[1] Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton in the *Nineteenth Century* for March 1906.

at any other period of her history, solely dependent on her land forces for immunity from conquest.

Having cleared the ground so far as false history had cumbered it, I will now call evidence for and against the possibility of this country's suffering invasion in the future —a very near future, according to some people.

There has, perhaps, never been a time when such a possibility has not been present to the minds of men responsible for England's safety; but, up to a recent date, France, not Germany, was the quarter from which invasion was looked for, and in the course of the last hundred years there have been several well-developed French scares. After the last of these, to which the Fashoda incident gave rise, the British Government of the day appointed a Royal Commission, presided over by the Duke of Norfolk, to inquire into the grounds on which the belief

in England's vulnerability was based. As the scope of this Commission's investigations was confined to the sufficiency and efficiency of the British land forces, the witnesses, with one exception, were military men or civilians, but their answers to the searching questions addressed to them made it so clear that, in their opinion, no French transports would ever put to sea so long as our Fleet kept the command of the Channel, that Mr. Balfour, in his double character of Prime Minister and President of the Defence Committee, felt justified in assuring the House of Commons that an openly organised invasion of this country might be regarded as impossible, and that a surprise attack was equally out of the question, as there would be no concealing the assembling of the large number of ships that would be needed to carry 100,000 men, allowing three tons of shipping per man—without counting horses—a figure which must have been

furnished to the speaker by experts in the business of transporting troops by sea.

Whether Mr. Balfour's assurances would have long been accounted satisfactory, had France remained the object of British suspicion, it is impossible to say, for hardly had his reassuring words been spoken than a new direction was given to the nation's fears, and, in an incredibly short time, Germany—a country with which we had always been on good terms, and whose commercial prosperity is bound up with our own—was accepted as the national foe.

It is not my business to trace the causes of this extraordinary change of thought and feeling; suffice it to say that it coincided with a struggle to establish conscription as the basis of our military system, and that lurid pictures of Germany's military strength, naval growth, and official efficiency, coupled with boldly expressed distrust of her aims and doubts of her good faith, were, and are

being, used to create in the British mind a sense of insecurity sufficiently strong to overcome its deep-rooted aversion to compulsory service. In military circles, dark hints of danger, and whispered threats of sudden action by which that danger should be dissipated, were soon current; but no person whose name carried weight with the general public lent himself to an open attempt to create a German scare till Lord Roberts, in a speech delivered on November 23, 1908, gave to that scare the broadest possible base by declaring that he had ascertained, beyond the possibility of doubt, that vessels suitable to the accommodation of 200,000 men—taking one and a half, not three, tons as sufficient for all requirements—were always available in the northern ports of Germany; that during several months in the year 200,000 men could be collected without any fuss or mobilisation arrangements; and that those 200,000 could be conveyed to the

selected ports and there embarked in much shorter time than Mr. Balfour had calculated for French soldiers.[1] Disembarkation, thanks to big liners and modern mechanical appliances, would also, so he asserted, be much easier than was generally supposed, and, even if the enterprise failed as a surprise, a few vessels, sent in this direction or that, would be likely so to divert our Admirals' attention from the real German objective that the great fleet of transports, favoured perhaps by fog, might sail unseen across the North Sea, and land their living cargoes before the mistake could be discovered, and our deluded fleets rush back to prevent an already accomplished fact.[2]

[1] Mr. Balfour's speech in 1905, on the possibility of a French invasion of this country, involved the assumption that what was impossible to the State nearest to our shores was *a fortiori* impossible in the case of Germany.—H. B. H.

[2] "If our naval forces are to be fooled by so unsurprising a surprise as this, or by so time-honoured a *ruse de guerre*, I confess I do not see the use of our having an Admiralty or a Navy at all. No one would do Lord Roberts the in-

The picture was gloomy enough, but, lest sanguine people might take comfort and courage from the reflection that when our Fleet did return, it would capture all the German transports and make short work of its escorting squadron, Lord Roberts warned his hearers that, to gain their end, the Germans might not shrink from this sacrifice, for did not General Bronsart von Schellendorff, in his book on *The Duties of the General Staff*, assert that "the advantage of gaining the command of the sea, at least for a time, and thereby making possible the transport of troops by sea, may justify the loss of our own fleet?" "These remarkable words," continued Lord Roberts, "represent the best German teaching on the co-operation of the two services in war,"

justice of supposing for one single moment that he and his staff in the field would allow themselves to be fooled in this way on land" (extract from a letter which appeared in *The Times* of November 30, 1908, in large print, signed by a "Modern Mariner."—H. B. H.

and on the strength of a vision of a huge German flotilla, escorted by the whole German Fleet, sailing cheerfully across the North Sea, in a friendly fog, to certain capture or destruction, nobly indifferent to its own fate, if it could but succeed in placing two hundred thousand German troops in a position in which they could not be reinforced, and from which they could not retire, he closed his speech by calling for the immediate formation of a British citizen army of a million men.[1]

I hardly think I need assure my military and naval readers that General von Schellendorff had not the invasion of England in his mind, when he wrote the sentence which

[1] "No matter," Lord Roberts said, "how strong and powerful our Navy is, the main preventive of invasion is a numerous and efficient Home Army. . . Even if our Navy were double as strong as it is relatively to that of other Powers, the necessity of maintaining a sufficient and efficient Citizen Army for home defence would still be an essential condition of peace and security, as well as of public confidence." This "Citizen Army," he said, "must consist of a million men."—*The Times*, November 24, 1908.

Lord Roberts interpreted in that sense. The man who recognised that "The transport of troops is a very risky enterprise, if the command of the sea has not been gained, even when the troopships are escorted by a Fleet which is superior to the enemy's ships,"[1] and that "No force is more sensitive about its communications than a landing-force; it has no broad base upon which it can fall back, but must retire upon a single point—its landing-place,"[2] was incapable of recommending to his students an act of suicidal folly; and no one can read the chapter on "The Co-operation of the Army and Navy in War," from which Lord Roberts quoted, without being convinced that the only circumstances in which the writer would hold it lawful to sacrifice even a portion of a nation's fleet in order to make possible the transport of

[1] *The Duties of the General Staff*, p. 554. [4th edition.]
[2] *Ibid.* p. 556.

troops by sea, are to be found in the case of an army *whose land communications are assured*, requiring to be quickly reinforced, or relieved to some extent of pressure by the landing of troops at some vital point of the enemy's coast.

It is fortunate for me and my readers that the facts and arguments which answer Lord Roberts's speech, also answer everything that has been said or written, from his point of view; for all subsequent speakers and writers, who have helped to spread the German scare, have based themselves on his assertions and covered themselves with his reputation. Answers to that speech were not long in coming. A week after its delivery, in a letter to *The Times*,[1] Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton ridiculed the late Commander-in-Chief's assertion that he had ascertained, without the possibility of doubt, that vessels accommodating 200,000 men were at very

[1] November 30, 1908.

short notice available in German ports—a waste of German capital on which Sir Vesey desired to have the opinion of "some of our mercantile magnates, if such is likely to be the case," as also "the opinions of Sir A. Wilson, Lord C. Beresford, Sir W. May [now at the Admiralty], Sir Compton Domvile, and others, and ask them their opinion as to even 100,000 troops and their baggage having a happy time of it crossing the North Sea, being carried in transports commanded by men totally unaccustomed to sailing in company—harassed by a host of mosquito-boat destroyers, and all the portion of our Fleet 'not decoyed away.'"

Another letter of the same date, signed "Admiral," to which *The Times* accorded the honour of large type, severely criticised Lord Roberts's estimate of the amount of tonnage that "would be sufficient for all purposes" in such a serious undertaking as an invasion of England. "When preparing

this statement,' so he wrote, "Lord Roberts, and those who assisted him, appear to have insufficiently taken into consideration the fact that, in estimating for the tonnage of an over-sea expedition, regard must be taken not only of the number of men to be conveyed, but provision must at the same time be made for the huge equipment which in these days accompanies our army—guns, ammunition, stores of many descriptions, provisions, wagons, and last, but far from least, the horses, which call for a tonnage allowance far in excess of that for a man."

"No doubt," he continued, "it would be quite possible for a short voyage to put 4,000 men into a 6,000-tons vessel," but not 4,000 men *plus* the equipment, without which, on disembarkation, "the troops would find themselves in much the same position as ordinary passengers landing from a ship without luggage," whilst the equipment of an expedition must, fortunately for

England, always prove an obstacle to a rapid invasion of her shores," for "the landing in a few hours of many thousands of men in any sort of boat, from a gig to a launch, is a simple matter, but not so the equipment. Horses, guns, and wagons cannot descend a gangway ladder, but have to be hoisted out and then transported ashore in large boats especially suitable; weather, even though only moderately bad, being a serious hindrance and possibly a stopper on operations"

But the best refutation of Lord Roberts's depressing predictions is to be found in the Blue Book containing the evidence given before the Norfolk Royal Commission, for the chief witnesses who appeared before it, in virtue of the positions they held or had lately vacated, were peculiarly fitted to form a cool and reasoned judgment on the probability of our land forces ever being called on to repel a foreign invasion; and Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson,

K.C.B., Director-General of Intelligence, Colonel P. H. N. Lake, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-General for Mobilisation, and Major-General Sir John Ardagh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., Director of Military Intelligence from 1896 to 1901, were unanimously of opinion that England could never be the subject of a surprise invasion—the very kind of invasion which Lord Roberts would have us believe to be imminent. The first-named officer held that the British Government, under the most unfavourable circumstances, must have at least two months' warning of the projected attack[1]; the second, that fourteen days was the period in which the final preparations for embarking 100,000 men could be completed—"fourteen days," as he expressed it, "from the time when you say, 'Now I do not mind who knows [what] I am doing'"[2]; the third put the maximum

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 12 [Cd. 2062] of 1904.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 104, 105.

limit of 150,000 men as the utmost either France or Germany could do *from all their ports, and with long preparation.*" [1]

On the question of the probability of an invasion of England so long as the regular troops were in the country, the evidence of Lord Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief, may be taken as conclusive, and he supposed that "no attempt would be made at invasion of this country until we had sent all, or nearly all, of our regular troops abroad." [2]

This answer naturally led up to the inquiry whether there was reason to suppose that the country would ever be so denuded of its ordinary defenders as to render an invasion a comparatively easy matter, and on this point the evidence of an ex-Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, was very satisfactory. He admitted that the possibility of a heavy

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 119. The italics are mine.—H. B. H.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 38.

naval defeat or the temporary absence of our Fleet from the Channel must be taken into account in determining the strength of the force that must be held ready to meet an attempted invasion, which would be made very rapidly after the declaration of war; but he declared his conviction that no "Government would attempt to send our fighting Army away from England, unless England was quite secure from invasion at the moment."[1]

What military men understand by "quite secure" was explained by Sir William Nicholson, who declared that, until the command of the sea was indisputably in British hands, a condition which he thought would take from four to six months to fulfil, no large military contingent could be sent out of the country; certainly the Admiralty would not agree to their despatch. In other words, until every hostile vessel on the seas had been

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 65.

captured or destroyed, and every hostile port sealed, so that no ship could issue from it, the British Army must of necessity remain at home; so that England would be safe from invasion *before* she had obtained the command of the sea, by reason of the presence of her Army, and *after* she had obtained that command by reason of the fact that, whether her Army were present or absent, no hostile force could descend upon her shores.[1]

Not satisfied with answers which went to prove that no sane nation would dream of invading this country without some prospect of making good its footing here, the Norfolk Commission pushed its inquiries into those fantastic regions in which Lord Roberts was later to seek justification for his alarmist campaign, by asking Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, K.C.B., Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, whether, in view of the enormous shock that the landing of, perhaps,

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 3.

as much as three Army Corps on our shores would be to our national credit and prestige, he thought it would be worth while for an enemy, who had temporarily obtained command of the sea, to risk the loss of so large a force for the sake of the moral effect it would have on the country?

"I do not think," was the reply, "that they would risk it on an hypothesis of that kind. I do not think the game would be worth the candle."[1]

Sir Alfred was not prepared to say that a small invasion would be out of the bounds of possibility, but he was sure that "no serious invasion would take place by a foreign Power when the Navy was still on the deep, because, if so, communications would be cut, and that force would be in a position that no nation that was not absolutely insane, according to my ideas—I may be wrong—would risk."[2]

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 74. [2] *Ibid.* p. 75.

On this point the one naval witness, Admiral Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B., late a Naval Lord of the Admiralty, and Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, was equally emphatic. He granted that, if the theatre of war was in the Mediterranean and a very large proportion of the British Fleet were away from our shores, during that time a foreign force might possibly be thrown into England; but, on the other hand, there was this to be remembered, "that if we command the sea, directly the invasion takes place and our Fleets fall back on our own shores, then the possibility of that force ever returning to its country is at an end; it ought to be swallowed up in this country."[1]

Lastly, turning from the testimony to the practical invulnerability of this country given seven years ago, when the hypothetical invader was France, let us hear what the latest

[1] Blue Book, vol. i. p. 110.

authoritative witnesses, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, late First Sea Lord, have to say on the subject, now that Germany has taken the place of France in the popular mind.

In his work on *The Art of Naval Warfare*, Sir Cyprian gives a crushing reply to the extraordinary theory in support of which Lord Roberts has invoked General von Schellendorff's authority.

"Continental soldiers contemplating the invasion of an island State may," so he writes, "be ready, as some say that they are, to sacrifice their escorting fleet to the presumably stronger insular Navy," but how could they imagine that this sacrifice "would render the voyage of the invading troops practicable?" Even "if, in sacrificing itself, the escorting or protecting fleet had managed to put out of action a portion of the insular naval forces equal to itself, . . . the survivors of the stronger Navy would have the now

entirely unprotected transports at their mercy." The difference between passing an army into a contiguous State across a frontier often not wider than a mere geographical line, and "passing an army across the sea, in the teeth of a strong Navy's efforts to prevent it, is enormous," so he affirmed, adding that "The difficulties of work on the sea are not apparent to men whose work is done exclusively on shore, and so those difficulties are treated as non-existent."[1]

In a Memorandum of November 10, 1910, issued in 1911, Sir Arthur Wilson showed that the strength of our Fleet is determined by the necessity of protecting our commerce, and that, if it is sufficient for this purpose, it will practically be sufficient to prevent invasion. The main object of a fleet, whether employed in defence of commerce or in frustrating invasion, is to prevent the enemy's ships from getting to sea far enough to do

[1] *The Art of Naval Warfare*, pp. 170, 171, 173.

mischief, and any disposition that is even moderately successful in attaining this object will practically be effective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable and difficult to conceal, from reaching our shores. Even if the enemy succeeded in drawing off half our Fleet, the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports, even if supported by the strongest fleet he could collect.[1]

That the British Fleet *is* so disposed, as to be assured of success in the attainment of this object, I proved conclusively in the preceding chapter; and having now demonstrated how scanty, and of what small value, is the evidence in support of the belief in an invasion of this country, I might stop; but because some people are not satisfied until

[1] See Appendix, in which the Admiralty Memorandum is given *verbatim*.

they have gone to the root of a subject, and made acquaintance with the facts on which the opinions of experts must be founded—people for whom I have the greatest respect—I will now try to give my readers such an insight into all that an invasion of England would involve that they may be able to judge for themselves whether there is any justification for expecting one.[1]

[1] *The Times* Correspondent for Naval Affairs puts forward, with great plainness, statements utterly subversive of the alarmist attitude taken up by a large part of the Press. In the weekly edition of January 5 of this year he writes: "The theory of the Defending Fleet—the Fleet in being—having been decoyed away does not really help the opposite argument at all. . . . Even if the Battleship Fleet is absent—which it ought not to be so long as invasion is within the bounds of possibility, and never will be, if those who are conducting the war know their business—yet it is unthinkable that a sufficient defending force of cruisers and torpedo-craft should be absent at the same time."

# CHAPTER IV

## CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE: TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY

"Articles of provision are not to be trifled with or left to chance, and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished."—THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

"The chief necessity in war is that supplies should be abundant and quickly delivered."

GENERAL BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF.

"It consequently follows that armies cannot exist for any time, at any rate, in the field without uninterrupted communication with home."—*Idem.*

"The whole question is one of commissariat—that of commissariat one of transport."—THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

IN considering the possibility of an invasion of England, I will accept the conditions under which Lord Roberts believes that it will be undertaken.[1]

[1] See Lord Roberts's speeches in the House of Lords on November 23, 1908; April 3, 1911; and February 20, 1912.

These conditions are four :

The first, that a large part of our Navy — say half — will be absent from our shores.

The second, that a large expeditionary Force — say 100,000 men — will have been despatched to Egypt or India, or some other of our over-sea dominions.

The third, that the invasion will be in the nature of a surprise, without a declaration of war, and at a time when our relations with Germany are such as to give rise to no suspicion of hostile intention on her part.

The fourth, that the invading Army will consist of 150,000 troops.

These disputable conditions agreed to, let us now recall what was said in Chapter II as to the relative strength of the German and British Fleets in their respective Home Waters.

GERMANY'S NAVAL STRENGTH IN THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEA

(See Abstract of Table IIIB, p. 17.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Line-of-Battleships | 27 |
| Armoured Cruisers | 1 |
| Protected Cruisers | 7 |
| Destroyers | 36[1] |
| Total | 71 |

GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVAL STRENGTH IN THE HOME AND IRISH WATERS

(See Abstract of Table IIIA, p. 16.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Line-of-Battleships | 51 |
| Armoured Cruisers | 26 |
| Protected Cruisers | 40 |
| Scouts | 8 |
| Destroyers | 165[1] |
| Total | 290 |

From the British strength deduct 25 battleships, 13 armoured cruisers, and 20 protected cruisers (the number of small craft would in no circumstances have been

[1] A large reserve of destroyers, torpedo-boats, and submarines will still be in the ports of both nations; but here too Great Britain will be greatly superior to Germany (see Table VI).—H. B. H.

reduced), and we shall be left with a fleet weaker by one battleship than Germany, but stronger by 12 armoured cruisers, 13 protected cruisers, and 137 scouts and destroyers, specially adapted for acting against transports conveying troops—a superiority sufficient to justify Sir Arthur Wilson's confidence that, with half our Home Fleet away, "the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his [the enemy's] transports, even if supported by the strongest fleet he could collect."

Having established the naval conditions under which a German invasion would be carried out, we must next institute a comparison between the attacking and the defending military forces.

According to Lord Roberts's last condition, the former is to consist of 150,000 troops, and we may assume that they will

be picked troops, the best Germany can put into the field. What will Great Britain be able to oppose to them?

The strength of our fighting force at home, irrespective of troops in India and the Colonies, is as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Regular Army | | 129,503 [1] |
| Staff, Departments, etc. | | 2,474 [2] |
| Army Reserve | | 138,531 [2] |
| Special Reserve (old Militia) | | 60,931 [2] |
| Royal Marines | | 17,200 [3] |
| Coast Guard | | 3,048 [3] |
| National Reserve | | 54,481 [4] |
| Militia | 1,655 | 1,860 [2] |
| Militia Reserve | 205 | |
| Territorial Force: | | |
| Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men | 264,911 | 268,353 [2] |
| Permanent Staff | 2,786 | |
| Reserve | 656 | |
| Total | | 676,381 |

[1] General Report of the British Army, War Office 1912 [Cd. 6065], p. 34.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 26.

[3] First Lord's Statement on Navy Estimates [Cd. 6106], p. 10.

[4] General Report of the British Army, p. 125. Strength to-day is 78,000.—H. B. H.

Of the above we will suppose the following to be out of England, on garrison duty, or on board ship.

Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men, consisting of:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Regular Army | 50,000 | 100,000 |
| Regular Reserve | 50,000 | |
| Royal Marines on board ship, or garrison duty | | 17,200 |
| National Reserve on garrison duty | | 24,481 |
| Militia on garrison duty | | 1,860 |
| Territorial Force on garrison duty | | 68,353 |
| Total | | 211,894 |

Leaving for the active defence of the country:

| | |
|---|---|
| Regular Army | 79,503 |
| Staff, Departments, etc. | 2,474 |
| Army Reserve | 88,531 |
| Special Reserve (old Militia) | 60,931 |
| Coast Guard | 3,048 |
| National Reserve | 30,000 |
| Territorial Force | 200,000 |
| Total | 464,487 |

Of this number 264,487 would be in all respects the equals of any troops that might be pitted against them, while the 200,000 Territorials, stiffened by 30,000 National Reservists, fighting side by side with the Regulars, and working in an enclosed country like England, would, even to-day, be a formidable foe to an invading force, whose long scattered lines would be open to attack at a thousand vulnerable points.[1] But since our Army Scheme provides for their embodiment on the despatch of the Regular troops from the country, they will have been in training and under full discipline for a considerable time before their services can be required, for I will not admit that Germany can make her arrangements for an over-sea

[1] The Territorials should be taught to take up strategical points, and when the enemy had deployed, or had partially deployed, to disperse and fall on his flanks and rear. These were the tactics which the Duke of Wellington recommended to his half-trained Spanish allies in the Peninsular War.—H. B. H.

war at a moment's notice, however accommodating I may be as regards her success in concealing those arrangements.

Of course we shall not be able to put the whole of our strength into the field, but then no more can the Germans; both sides—but specially the attacking side—will have to make large deductions for the guarding of its base and line of communications, also for rear, hospital, and baggage guards, for flanking and reconnoitring parties, patrols, observation posts, and for casualties from death, sickness, and wounds both among men and horses; and whenever or wherever the encounter which is to decide the fate of the invasion takes place, the advantage in numbers will be on the British side, even without the Territorials, overwhelmingly so if we take them into our calculations, as we shall be justified in doing.

Having compared the two Forces as a whole, we will now consider the relative

value of the units of which each is composed —not the regiments, but the individual men.

Since Germany's astonishing military successes in 1866 and 1870, the German soldier has been looked on as the best in the world; but, without wishing to disparage either his physical or his mental qualities, I doubt whether he would prove the superior of the British soldier; firstly, because he is a conscript and short-service man,[1] whilst his British rival is voluntarily enlisted and serves seven years, sometimes eight, before passing into the Reserve; and, secondly, because for forty years the German Army has seen no fighting, whereas most English regiments have taken part in Indian Frontier Expeditions, invaluable experience for any kind of warfare, and many of the non-commissioned

[1] Service with the Colours is three years with the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, and two years with other arms."—*Strength and Organisation of the Armies of France, Germany, and Japan.* See *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* for February 1912.

officers still in our ranks and most men of the Reserve saw service in South Africa.[1] Then, too, the special conditions under which an invasion of this country must be entered on would place the German soldier at a disadvantage with regard to the British soldier, against whom he will have to make good his footing in this island: the hurried embarkation; the long, probably stormy voyage, terribly trying to men the majority of whom will never before have been at sea; the risks run; the catastrophes witnessed (for I am not assuming that our reduced Fleet will be hoodwinked to the last moment, nor yet that it will be commanded by incapables, or cowards); the difficult landing from the transports that had escaped destruction or disablement,—all these things will, at least at the outset, impair his *morale* and diminish his physical efficiency.

[1] There may have been many "regrettable incidents" in the Boer War, but in its hard and difficult school many lessons were learnt, lessons not yet forgotten.—H. B. H.

But where Germany really has no equal is in her military organisation; and, in the light of this admission, let us now inquire into the composition of the Force which is presently to descend upon our shores.

The German Peace Establishment consists of twenty-three Army Corps, and each Army Corps, when placed on a war footing, is composed of[1]:

| | |
|---|---|
| Troops | 25,000 |
| Non-Combatants | 16,000 |
| Horses | 13,000 |
| Guns | 144 |
| Vehicles, including artillery wagons | 2,200 |

Its nominal formation is[1]:

| | |
|---|---|
| Battalions of Infantry | 25 |
| Squadrons of Cavalry | 6 |
| Batteries of Artillery | 24 |

and its fighting strength[1]:

| | |
|---|---|
| Men | 25,000 |
| Horses | 1,900 |
| Guns | 144 |

[1] *The Duties of the General Staff*, pp. 272, 273, by General Bronsart von Schellendorff.

Therefore, for the invasion of England on what Lord Roberts considers a scale commensurate to the difficulty of the enterprise—*i.e.* 150,000 soldiers—Germany must mobilise and send out of the country six Army Corps—a risky step to take, seeing that to the east of her lies Russia, with twenty-three Army Corps, and to the west, France, with twenty, and that in neither of these neighbours has she complete confidence. However, as we have already granted so much to our alarmists, we will concede that, in this particular also, Germany will allow hatred of England to out-weigh respect for her own safety, and continue our investigations.

Six Army Corps,[1] as we now see, mean

[1] Lord Roberts sees no reason why the invading army should not consist of nine Army Corps: "Considering, my Lords [so he said], that in all the large Continental ports steamers each capable of carrying 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers for a short voyage can always be made available, 70,000 multiplied by two, or even by three, would require quite a small number of vessels for their transport."—Speech in the House of Lords, February 20, 1912.

not only six times 25,000 fighting men, but six times 16,000 non-combatants, six times 13,000 horses, six times 144 guns, and six times 2,200 vehicles, or:

| | |
|---|---|
| Troops | 150,000 |
| Non-Combatants | 96,000 |
| Horses | 78,000 |
| Guns | 864 |
| Vehicles | 13,200 |

I can imagine that this table will be received with an outcry of protestation. "What, 96,000 non-combatants to 150,000 troops! 78,000 horses, 13,200 vehicles! The thing is monstrous! We never allowed for such superfluities!

True, the men who have found satisfaction in terrifying themselves and others with visions of 150,000 German soldiers landing on our coast one day, and marching on London the next, never have made any allowance for non-combatants, nor for carts and wagons, nor for horses to draw them; yet non-combatants and carts and wagons

have to accompany every army, and, without them, it can neither march, nor fight, nor live.

Ninety-six thousand non-combatants to 150,000 troops is not too large a proportion when one remembers all the duties that they have to fulfil. Think of the eighteen bearer-companies, three to each Army Corps, and of the attendants in the forty-eight field hospitals, and the clerks and the telegraphists and the store-keepers, and the surgeons and their assistants, and the veterinary surgeons, and the mechanics and the bakers, and officers' servants, and to all these and many others, falling under headings too numerous to enumerate, add the drivers of the 13,200 vehicles, some, two-horse carts needing only one man to look after them, but some would be wagons with four and six horses, calling for two or three men's care; and as for the vehicles, hear what General Bronsart von Schellendorff, whose teaching is, as we know, the

last word in military science, has to say about them:

"This apparently enormous number of vehicles is unavoidable, if the troops are to be kept supplied with all they need. The transport with the troops and the ammunition columns[1] enable the troops to be ready for battle. The telegraph carts, pontoons, tool carts, etc., increase their efficiency; the field bakery, supply and transport columns, assure their being fed under difficulties; the wagons of the medical units are required for the sick and wounded, and allow of the erection of field hospitals."[2]

But the scaremongers, who have not allowed for non-combatants and vehicles to carry an Army's supplies, nor yet for the supplies themselves, are not likely to have considered such trifles as telegraphs and

[1] Seventy-two ammunition columns, twelve to each Army Corps.—H. B. H.

[2] *The Duties of the General Staff*, p. 273.

tools and hospital wagons. In their dark dreams the enemy is to live on the country, carry his commandeered food and forage in carts provided and horsed by the inhabitants, and either use our hospital wagons and hospitals, or have no sick and wounded to impede their triumphant advance, all the casualties being, presumably, on our side.

Listen again to General von Schellendorff. Treating of the possibility of equipping men with horses in an enemy's country, he writes: "Few remounts for the combatant branches are obtainable"[1]; and of food and forage: "As, moreover, all such supplies, both as regards quantity and quality, must always be of a doubtful character, any organisation intended to maintain the efficiency of Armies in the field must depend on communications with home being properly maintained."[2]

[1] *Duties of the General Staff*, p. 528.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 528, 529.

Why properly maintained? Because it is from home that the supplies must come; and since the German Army, on the morrow of its landing in England, will find its communications cut, what will be the amount of supplies that it must bring with it in the first and last instance?

In the foregoing tables I have omitted one item: to every four German Army Corps it is usual to attach one or two independent Cavalry divisions,[1] each composed of three brigades of two regiments, each of four squadrons; and these three brigades, together with two batteries of Horse Artillery, a light Ammunition Column, and an Engineer detachment, require 5,000 horses. My reason for omitting the two independent Cavalry divisions which ought

[1] "With a peace establishment of twenty-two Army Corps, which would probably in case of war be organised as five or six Armies, each Army must consist of about four Army Corps, and *one or two Cavalry divisions*."—*Duties of the General Staff*, p. 235. (The italics are mine.—H. B. H.)

to accompany the invading Army from my calculations, is solely due to my desire not to complicate further a problem which, as I have stated it, is already difficult enough, for I am not satisfied that six squadrons to each Army Corps will prove equal to the many duties that Cavalry are called on to perform [1]; and I am quite in agreement with Sir John French, who told the Norfolk Commission, in answering the question whether an invader would bring only "a small number [of mounted men], but very good what he did bring," that "he [the enemy] would bring his proper proportion of Cavalry, I think. Probably the railways would be cut, and he would not be able to

[1] "As a matter of fact, it sometimes happens, as experience has shown, that both sides remain watching each other till nightfall. Any one who has experienced this knows the frightful tension of the nerves which such a state of affairs produces. The remedy lies, indeed, in having a Cavalry superior to that of the enemy, either in numbers or skill, and being able to be beforehand in getting an insight into his position, numbers, strength, movements, and intentions."—*Duties of the General Staff*, p. 480.

use them at first. He would have nothing but Cavalry to rely upon for information."[1]

Doubtless I shall be reminded that Sir John French spoke before the dawn of the aeroplane age, and that the Germans would rely not only upon Cavalry, but upon a body of airmen for information.

That the hypothetical invading Army will be equipped with aeroplanes I do not question, but, in view of their frailness and their dependence on weather conditions, no sensible commander will rely solely upon them for information[2]; and scouting to discover the enemy is only one of the objects for which Cavalry are needed: screening the Army so as to secure it against surprise is also one of their functions, and yet another, the collection of supplies; and, bring with them what they may, the

[1] *Report of the Norfolk Commission*, vol. i. p. 91.

[2] Napoleon held that the most reliable information was to be obtained from prisoners. Aeroplanes could not hope to make prisoners.—H. B. H.

Germans will still need to pick up, day by day, all the local food and forage they can lay their hands on.

I emphasise this point because there are men who, in their desire to smooth the way before our German invaders, would have us believe that "they will not be hampered by over-much Artillery or Cavalry, arms difficult to employ in enclosed country,"[1] and others who go yet farther, and assure us that they will come without horses, and may so confidently reckon on finding horses and provisions in England that, soon after landing, they will be as well horsed as our own Territorial Cavalry[2]—innocently ignorant of the fact that horses are needed to capture horses and unearth provisions.

"No, our alarmists cannot have it both

[1] The late Sir E. Collen's article on "The Real Military Problem and its Solutions" in *The National Review* for April 1911.

[2] Speech by Lord Ellenborough in the House of Lords, see *The Times*, April 4, 1911.

ways—either they must allow that the Germans will bring their supplies with them, and the vehicles to carry those supplies and the horses to draw the vehicles, or else that they will bring Cavalry—large numbers of Cavalry—to hunt for supplies and for horses and carts, and to cover the Infantry that will be needed to bring their booty into camp. German Generals and German Staff Officers are not magicians, but sensible, well-informed men, who will conduct war in this country on the same lines, and with the same precautions, as they would recognise to be essential in any other country; and if they know that this cannot be done, will stay at home, and not gratify their English admirers by such a display of military recklessness as the world has never yet witnessed.

They may, or may not, be acquainted with the despatch in which Sir Arthur Wellesley refused to lead an imperfectly equipped force to Egypt; but they know as well as that

great commander that "Articles of Provision are not to be trifled with or left to chance, and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished."[1]

[1] Despatch, dated February 18, 1801.

# CHAPTER V

## THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

"In war nothing is to be done but by calculation. Whatever is not profoundly considered in its details produces no good results."

NAPOLEON.

"For the transport of a force of any size considerable preparation is required even by Great Britain."—*Lecture on Transport of Troops by Sea, by* MAJOR F. C. H. CLARKE, C.M.G., *Professor at the Staff College.*

"Preparations for oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they caused."—*Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by* JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M.

IN the foregoing chapter I described the constitution of a German Army supposed to be adequate in point of numbers to the task of invading England: in the present chapter I shall inquire into the amount and nature of the shipping that Germany has at her command for the conveyance of that army to our shores.

Now, the first question that we must ask ourselves is this: Will the Expeditionary Force sail from one port or several? and to answer it we must consider what would be the effect on our own great ports of a sudden influx of 246,000 men—150,000 troops, 96,000 non-combatants. It would nearly double the population of Newcastle-on-Tyne (285,000) or Hull (280,000); more than double the population of Portsmouth (217,989), and treble the population of Southampton (127,159), or Plymouth (126,265); and whereas these figures include men, women, and children, down to infants in arms, the quarter of a million newcomers would all be strong young men who, hard at work from morning till night, would require full rations to keep them in proper condition, and the same would be true of the 78,000 horses.

Now, I assert that, within a few days of the descent of this multitude upon Newcastle, Hull, Portsmouth, Southampton, or

Plymouth, both it and the original inhabitants of any one of those towns would be brought to the verge of starvation, for no town has more than a few days' food in hand, and the railways, blocked with troops, horses, guns, military carriage and stores, would be unable to bring up even the usual daily supplies, let alone the additions to them demanded by the increase in the number of mouths requiring to be filled; and as German towns are unlikely to be better stocked than ours, no better able, therefore, to bear the strain that would be thrown upon their resources, if the attempt were made to embark the whole of the Army destined for the invasion of England from a single point, we may safely assume that it will be broken up, probably into three parts, sailing respectively from the Rivers Elbe, Weser, and Jahde Bay.[1]

[1] Port on the Elbe—Hamburg; on the Weser—Bremen; and on the Jahde—Wilhelmshaven.

Has Germany sufficient tonnage of her own to carry six Army Corps and their equipment across the North Sea? That is the second question to which we must find an answer. Her total ocean tonnage is 2,300,000 gross,[1] one-third of which is estimated to be in foreign ports, one-third on the sea, and the remaining 766,666 tons in home waters; but, practically, none of this third would be ready for use; many vessels would be loading or unloading; some just arriving, some ready to weigh anchor, some in dock being overhauled, a few even stripped and undergoing a thorough examination of their boilers and machinery.[2] Of course there are always

[1] L. G. Chiozza Money, M.P.

[2] "A liner arriving at her home port is forthwith taken in hand in preparation for her next trip, which involves much labour. Her machinery is all opened out for examination and adjustment, her boilers are emptied and overhauled, her tubes swept, her coal-bunkers replenished, her bottom surfaces cleansed and coated with composition in dry dock. In the majority of cases her crew are discharged while she is in port, and do not sign on again till she is ready for sea." —"Invasion from the Nautical Standpoint," by "Master Mariner," *Contemporary Review* for March 1911, p. 280.

a number of sailing vessels in every German harbour, but as they would need to be towed by steamers, they would be quite unsuitable for employment in a surprise invasion.[1]

The next step to the correct solution of the problem of sea-transport by which the German Government will be confronted is the determining the amount of tonnage that will be needed for the conveyance of :

| | |
|---|---|
| Men . . . . . | 246,000 |
| Horses . . . . . | 78,000 |
| Guns . . . . . | 864 |
| Vehicles . . . . . | 13,200 |

According to Lord Wolseley (see *Soldiers' Pocket-book*, pp. 180, 181), 1½ tons net

[1] We have frequently made use of sailing vessels towed by steamers in over-sea expeditions. In the transport of troops to the Crimea 24 steamers and 64 sailing vessels were employed. In the China War of 1860, out of 200 ships a large number were sailing vessels. The sea-transport in the Abyssinian Expedition was made up of 75 steamers and 205 sailing ships. In 1878 the Indian contingent was carried to Malta in 12 steamers and 15 sailing vessels, but in none of these cases were secrecy and speed essential.—H. B. H.

per man and 2½ tons net per horse must be allowed "for very short voyages, such as crossing the English or Irish Channels"; and 2 tons net per man and 6 tons net per horse "for voyages not exceeding a week" in duration.[1] The latter estimate includes "space for one month's forage and provisions,"[2] a reasonable and prudent allowance with which to meet the needs of an army during the voyage and the period of debarkation, and to fill up the supply and transport columns, and stock the magazines at the base on landing. The length of the

[1] Another authority writes: "(1) For a short voyage of a few hours, a man requires an allowance of 1½ tons, a horse 2½ tons; (2) for a voyage under a week, 2 tons per man, 6 per horse. . . . In these calculations are included arms, ammunition, stores, 1st Line transport complete, together with provisions and forage for one month in the second case . . . but not tents or other 2nd Line transport. When a large amount of transport-vehicles accompanies, additional tonnage must be added. For 2nd Line transport, extra stores, hospital ships and food beyond the aforesaid provision, other vessels will be required."—*Staff Duties*, by Major F. C. H. Clarke, Professor at the Staff College, p. 226.

[2] Wolseley's *Soldiers' Pocket-book*, p. 181.

passage from the German ports to the British coast being uncertain, but in all circumstances likely greatly to exceed what Lord Wolseley understands by *a very short voyage*, we will take his second estimate as the basis of our calculations, with all the more assurance because, as Colonel Furse says, "It is not considered prudent ever to base the calculations on short voyages, for the alertness of the enemy, or unfavourable weather for landing, might keep the troops on board a longer time than was anticipated, or might make it necessary to steam away to attempt the landing in some place other than the one originally contemplated."[1]

As, however, Lord Wolseley calculates in *net* tonnage, whilst the tonnage of German shipping has been given in *gross*, we will begin by ascertaining the relation in which the one stands to the other.

[1] *Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas*, by Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B., vol. i. pp. 207, 208.

Now, net tonnage means that part of a vessel's carrying capacity which remains for the accommodation of passengers and freight after all its own requirements have been met, a large allowance having always to be made for such spaces as engine room, crew room, coal bunkers, etc. Lord Wolseley's rule for raising net to gross for merchant steamers is to add 53 per cent. to the former,[1] but Major Clarke considers that an addition of about 66 per cent. is necessary,[2] and Colonel G. A. Furse, perhaps a still greater authority, is in favour of 70 per cent.[3]; but, faithful to my custom of under, rather than over, estimating Germany's difficulties, I will content myself with adding 50 per cent. in arriving at the amount of gross tonnage that she will require to accommodate her Invading Force.

[1] *The Soldiers' Pocket-book*, p. 181.
[2] *Staff Duties*, p. 266.
[3] *Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas*, p. 208.

| | |
|---|---|
| For 246,000 men at 2 tons per man . . . . . | 492,000 net |
| For 78,000 horses at 6 tons per horse . . . . . | 468,000 „ |
| Total . . . . | 960,000 „ |

Nine hundred and sixty thousand tons *net* plus 50 per cent. = 1,440,000 *gross*, or 673,334 tons in excess of the amount to be found at any one time in all the German ports.

The following examples of our Admiralty's estimates for over-seas expeditions, quoted by Colonel Furse in his book *Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas*, p. 209, will show how careful I have been to avoid anything like exaggeration in my own estimates.

*First Estimate*

"Independently of warlike materials, stores and provisions," sea transport of 260,047 tons would have to be taken up for an English Army Corps which consists of:

| | |
|---|---|
| Officers, Men, and Non-Combatants . | 35,087 |
| Horses and pack animals . . . | 10,121 |
| Carriages „ „ . . . | 1,736 |

Multiplying 260,047 tons by 6, we obtain 1,560,282 tons, as against my estimate of 1,440,000 for Germany's six Army Corps; and my readers will remember that a German Army Corps [41,000 men], is considerably larger than an English one [35,087 men], being in the proportion of nearly six to five.

*Second Estimate*

Four hundred and fifty-seven thousand one hundred and twelve tons would be required for an army consisting of:

| | Men | Horses | Carriages | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army Corps . | 35,087 | 10,121 | 1,736 | |
| Cavalry Division | 6,700 | 6,677 | 454 | |
| Troops for Lines of Communication | 11,959 | 3,278 | 401 | |
| Total . | 53,746 | 20,076 | 2,591 | =457,112 tons |

And Furse remarks that the provision of suitable ships for the transport of this force

would "tax all the energies of the Transport Department of the Admiralty."

But if there is no escape from the law that in reckoning sea transport one must calculate on a *net* basis, the only way in which Germany can provide herself with the tonnage she will require, is to seize all foreign vessels lying in her ports—all of them, of course, in the same state of unreadiness as her own.

I doubt whether this expedient would suffice, and I am certain that she would hesitate to commit such a breach of international law at the risk of embroiling herself with all the maritime nations of the world; but as, for argument's sake, I have not refused to attribute to her other impossible and discreditable acts, I am ready to allow that she will confiscate the foreign shipping in her harbours, and that it will be sufficient for her needs; nay, I will go further, and as I have assumed that she will be able to conceal the transformation of her own

merchant vessels into transports, so, now, I will grant that she will succeed in so sealing her harbours, and in so controlling her post-offices and telegraphs, that no whisper of this high-handed proceeding will reach the outer world. But here a new difficulty presents itself: the greater part of all the impressed vessels, whether native or foreign, will be fully or partially loaded. What is to be done with their cargoes? "Land them," you will say. But where? At each of the three ports of embarkation the quays must be kept free from obstruction of every kind, to make room for troops and baggage, horses and wagons, guns and stores, and I greatly fear that, as a preliminary to preparing merchant ships for their new duties, their cargoes will have to be flung overboard. There might be unpleasantness with their crews, especially with foreign crews, but they could be overpowered and replaced by German seamen, of whom, of course, there would be the necessary reserve at hand!

We have determined the tonnage that Germany will require; we have still to estimate the number of ships among which that tonnage will be divided. She has 109 ships of about 5,000 tons,[1] but as two-thirds of these will be abroad or at sea, she will only have about 36 vessels at home, and as she would need 288 steamers of that capacity to accommodate six Army Corps, or 418 ships between 2,000 and 5,000 tons,[2] each of her three flotillas would consist of 139 vessels,

[1] To be absolutely correct, 109 ships between 4,000 and 5,000 tons.—H. B. H.

[2] As a matter of fact Germany possesses no such mercantile fleet, but for the sake of argument, I will suppose she does. She has 489 steamships, varying between 2,000 tons and 30,000 (see chap. ii. p. 25), whose carrying capacity is approximately 2,485,500 tons gross. As, however, only one-third of these steamers will be in home waters—the remainder being at sea or in foreign ports—there will only be 828,500 tons available for the conveyance of the three Army Corps across the North Sea. As 1,440,000 gross tons are required for the invasionary army, provision must be made for carrying the difference between 1,440,000 and 828,500, namely 611,500 tons gross, and Germany will therefore have to press into her service a sufficient number of foreign vessels to make good the deficiency in steamers.—H. B. H.

a few very large, some of moderate size, a number small, and of such varying speeds that the Admiralty Memorandum, from which I quoted in a previous chapter, was over-liberal in attributing to the invading fleet an average of 10 to 12 knots an hour, for certain conditions, to be mentioned later, will tend to make its progress very slow.

Having now provided our army with sea-transport, we will follow its movements through their various stages—mobilisation, concentration, embarkation, voyage, debarkation—and after.


LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

# CHAPTER VI

## MOBILISATION : CONCENTRATION : EMBARKATION

"When we cannot embark at proper wharves or jetties, but out at sea with more or less motion, the shipping of horses, guns, wagons, and military carriages must always occupy a considerable time."—COLONEL G. A. FURSE, C.B.

"It is a fact beyond dispute that the attention paid in embarking the troops, war materials, and provisions for an expedition beyond the sea will always reveal itself when the hour of disembarkation arrives."—*Idem.*

MOBILISATION and concentration are distinct operations; the former consists in raising the peace establishments of an army to a war footing, the latter in bringing its different units together; but as concentration begins as soon as the mobilisation of a few units is completed, the two operations go on simultaneously, almost from the beginning.

## *Mobilisation*

In ordinary times all standing armies are kept, for economical reasons, below their reputed strength; but the moment hostilities are imminent, officers and men absent on leave or furlough rejoin their regiments, corps, or departments; the reserves are called out, and all reservists pronounced fit for active service, after a strict medical examination, are furnished with clothing, arms, and equipment; remounts are purchased, and owners of registered horses and wagons are required by the civil authorities to deliver them, under heavy penalties for disobedience or delay, at certain indicated points, where the unfit are rejected, and the fit passed into the several branches of the Service, to the work of which they are best suited, the accepted horses and those purchased being fitted with saddles, harness, etc. Artillery

trains, ammunition columns, supply and transport trains are organised, field hospitals equipped, bearer corps brought up to war strength, provisions for the troops and forage for the horses collected at convenient places along the lines of railway and at the final point of concentration, and arrangements made for the billeting and sheltering of men and beasts both at that point and at the towns where halts are likely to occur; whilst immense quantities of locomotive engines and rolling stock of every kind are brought together at the stations where regiments and corps are ordered to entrain.

Lord Roberts believes that, under cover of the General Autumn Manœuvres, these preliminary steps can be taken "without any fuss," by which he means, without exciting remark or suspicion; but even the lay reader will have his doubts as to the probability of concealing the object of such

extraordinary measures, and experienced military men, knowing to how great an extent mobilisation for manœuvres differs from mobilisation for war, will pronounce such secrecy impossible; but if we accept the possibility of such deception being successfully practised, it could only extend to the measures enumerated above; no General Manœuvres could account for the activity of the naval authorities, whose preparations must keep pace with those of their military and civil colleagues, if England be the object that the German Government has in view. It would be their business to take up shipping—all the shipping in their respective ports—and to prepare it for the reception of men, horses, guns, ammunition,[1] artillery wagons, supply and transport carriage, provisions, stores, etc. It takes six days to fit a merchant steamer

[1] For ammunition special arrangements must be made.—H. B H

for the conveyance of men and material, ten days to put in the necessary fittings for horses, for whose use the larger vessels must be reserved, as the only proper place for them is on the main deck, where in small vessels there would be no room for the stalls, without which it is impossible to ensure their safety or to hope to land them in good condition.[1] Placed on the upper deck they add greatly to the rolling of the ship, and in heavy weather the horses and stalls are in danger of being washed overboard.[2] This occurred on the voyage of the *Queen* to Natal in 1881, when a number of horses were lost before she reached St. Vincent. After the Abyssinian Expedition, in which he was disembarkation officer, Lord Roberts was so convinced of the necessity of the horse transports being

[1] *Military Transport*, pp. 158, 160, by Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B.

[2] *Staff Duties*, p. 230, by Major F. C. H. Clarke, C.M.G.

provided with proper fittings, that he strongly recommended the Government to do the work themselves; since "it was a matter of indifference to ship owners whether the animals were lost or injured during the voyage, and the most careful inspection would not prevent their putting up the stalls as cheaply and as badly as possible."

No doubt the German Admiralty is alive to the need of proper fittings,[1] but it may be doubted whether they will have the skilled labour at their command to install them, at short notice, in the large number of ships that will be needed to carry 78,000 horses, or to ensure to those horses the ventilation without which they suffer severely from sea-sickness, a bad preparation for active service

[1] "To carry a number of horses, horse fittings must be erected. These are of an elaborate nature, and consist of stalls with padded breast boards and breech boards, slings, and other special fittings."—*The Duties of the General Staff*, by General von Schellendorff, p. 2.

in the field.[1] But transforming merchant ships into transports will not exhaust the demands on the resources of the German dockyards.

To make landing possible, every vessel must be provided with at least six boats and a steam tug, each boat capable of carrying from forty to sixty men, or ten horses, or one gun, or one wagon; and those intended for the landing of artillery and cavalry in shallow water, must be fitted with inclined and fall-down sterns. On the voyage, the boats will be stowed away on board, and the steam launches taken in tow by the vessel to which it is attached. A cumbersome and awkward arrangement at the best of times, and in bad weather quite out of

[1] "The heat is very distressing to horses on board ship, and apoplexy is one of the prevailing diseases; still, on the whole, horses suffer more at sea from the motion of the ship than from heat. Sea-sickness, the result of the motion, causes congestion of the brain, ending in madness, which proves rapidly fatal."—*Military Transport*, p. 164, by Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B.

the question, yet so essential to rapid disembarkation is an ample supply of landing-boats and small steamers to tow them, that, at all hazards, they must accompany the troopships, or the success of the expedition, as a surprise invasion, will be jeopardised.[1]

In the Persian Expedition of 1856, insufficient provision of landing-boats had been made, especially of landing-boats for horses, and in consequence it took three days and two nights to disembark 9,500 men and 1,500 animals. And again in the disembarkation experiments at Clacton-on-Sea, in 1904, it took two days to land 10,000 men, and though it is true that, for twenty-four hours, the weather was bad, still the delay was largely due to the fact

[1] "One of the chief points to be attended to is the provision of suitable boats and flats for landing men and horses, and material for the construction of piers. Each ship should be amply provided therewith and also with a steam pinnace."—*Staff Duties*, p. 239, by Major F. C. H. Clarke, C.M.G.

that there were too few steam tugs for the work.[1]

## *Concentration*

Concentration can be effected both by road and rail, the former being preferable for short distances, where the railway has only a single line. For example, an army corps that can be moved seventy-two miles by a double line in three days needs seven days to do the same distance by a single line, and only six days by road. But even where lines are double, it is frequently advisable to move a portion of an army by road to leave the railway free for the con-

[1] Lieutenant A. C. Dewar, R.N., advocates in his little work, *Is Invasion Impossible?* p. 53, providing every transport of 5,000 tons with twelve landing-boats—six for horses and six for wagons—and two steam launches, the former to be carried on deck, the latter to be taken in tow.

He admits that the launches present a difficulty, but they are a necessity for rapid disembarkation, and two of them must be assigned to each transport, "the weather being assumedly calm." But if these tugs are necessary and the weather is stormy—what then?—H. B. H.

veyance of military supplies of all kinds, and to prevent a total suspension of its ordinary traffic, on which the existence of the civil population depends.

German railways are not specially adapted to the use of troops. Like those of our own country, they were constructed to meet the requirements of peace, not those of war, and by some even of the double lined, owing to certain defects, it is hardly possible to despatch more than one troop train per hour.[1] Under the most favourable conditions, it takes five days to despatch a complete army corps, with its first and second lines of transport, in 118 trains[2] each of fifty or sixty carriages, from any given station, for, as General von Schellendorff points out, "entraining and detrain-

[1] These defects "are often connected with difficulties of an engineering or technical nature as regards the laying out of the line, and, consequently, are by no means easily remedied."—*The Duties of the General Staff*, pp. 332, 333, by General Bronsart von Schellendorff.

[2] This includes six supply trains.—*Ibid.* p. 340.

ing troops, and especially unloading trains conveying baggage or supplies, are operations, it should be remembered, requiring no inconsiderable amount of time."[1] In 1870, the Germans did actually mass a combatant force of 16,000 officers, 440,000 men, 135,000 horses, and 14,000 guns, on the French frontier in sixteen days, and we will assume that they can do the same to-day; but, so far as concentration for an invasion of England is concerned, such speed would rather be deprecated than desired, for there would be no use in overcrowding the ports with troops and material, until such time as the ships on which they are to embark are ready to receive them. A part of the Infantry should be first on the spot to help in the tedious task of unloading the trains of

[1] "In some cases, where local arrangements are ill adapted for the purpose, the difficulties may be so great as to cause the railway station in question to be practically excluded, or at any rate only considered as available at long intervals of time."—*The Duties of the General Staff*, p. 339.

horses and baggage, and clearing the stations of the contents of each train as it arrives, to make room for those that are following after. Horse trains should have precedence of trains carrying stores, baggage, transport vehicles, etc., for the sooner living creatures are taken out of the trucks the better. Indian officers have had plenty of experience of horses and transport animals of all kinds dying in trains from exposure, hunger, and thirst, owing to perhaps unavoidable delays and accidents; and even in Germany delays and accidents are not unknown, and in all countries the difficulty of feeding and watering animals on trains is great.

### *Embarkation*

"Organise and work as the Germans may, they will find it hard to avoid a great accumulation of men, beasts, baggage, and stores in the ports, for until the fittings of a ship are completed—those fittings including fresh-

water tanks in the holds rigged out with pumps [1]— no baggage must go on board, not only because its arrival causes inconvenience at the time, but because, unless the process of embarkation is carried through in an orderly, systematic way, the process of disembarkation will be attended with such confusion as may prove fatal to the expedition. It is impossible to give the order of embarkation in detail; suffice it to say that each unit occupying a troopship, whether it be a regiment or a battery, or a portion of such corps, must be complete in itself, *i.e.* it must have with it everything of which on landing it will stand in need—baggage, ammunition, camp equipment, stores, ani-

[1] "Few ships have sufficient arrangements for stowing away such a large quantity of water as is required for a large number of troops, and no point demands greater attention than the furnishing of transports with a plentiful supply of fresh water."—*Military Transport*, pp. 162, 163.

A man's allowance is one gallon of water per diem, a horse's eight gallons. At this rate six army corps, allowing 10 per cent. for waste, would consume over 400 tons of water per diem.—H. B. H.

mals, carts, wagons, etc.; that the reserve stores and provisions should be sent on board in advance; that regimental equipment and transport must come next, carts and wagons going into the hold, then the horses and the men in charge of them; and last, the main body of troops.

It is evident that for the proper carrying out of this complicated process a very large body of thoroughly instructed, experienced staff officers will be required. Now, German staff officers may be thoroughly instructed—that is to say, may have learnt all about embarkation that books can teach—and a few may have practised embarking a regiment or a battery; but no officers in the world have had experience of putting 50,000 troops —the number assigned to each of the three ports—and their belongings on shipboard. English officers have never had to deal with an oversea expedition numbering more than a few thousand men, and in all such expe-

ditions each vessel, or group of vessels, has put to sea as soon as its equipment was complete, leaving its place at the quay to be taken by another, or others; for, outside the harbour, no hostile fleet has been waiting to capture it, and however many thousand miles of water lay between it and the coast for which it was bound, wind and weather were the only foes it had to fear.[1]

Contrast this leisurely, care-free state of things with that which will prevail under conditions that demand that 139 ships shall be got ready simultaneously and steam out of port together. Only a small proportion of those 139 could be loaded from the wharves; to the majority, men, horses, guns, ammunition, stores, transport of all kinds, must be conveyed in lighters and troop-boats, out of which the horses must be slung on board,

[1] The British contingent of the Expeditionary Force to the Crimea, consisting of 33,500 men and 3,350 horses, escorted by 34 warships, is the largest organised body of troops that ever left these shores.—H. B. H.

and the wagons—loaded and on wheels, ready for immediate use on disembarkation—hoisted up and lowered down into the holds, a long and, in bad weather, dangerous operation; yet, good weather or bad, the work must go forward, for does not the whole success of a German invasion of England, according to the prophets who warn us to prepare against it, depend upon secrecy, and secrecy upon speed?

# CHAPTER VII

## VOYAGE: DISEMBARKATION; AND—AFTER

"As in a caravan, the speed is regulated by the pace of the slowest animal, so to keep transports together the rate of steaming should not exceed that of the slowest vessel."

COLONEL G. A. FURSE, C.B.

"A mass of transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war ever known."

JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M.

"If he [the enemy] is sighted by any of our destroyers at night, they will have little difficulty in avoiding the men-of-war and torpedoing the transports."

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., V.C.

"Directing your chief attention to the destruction of the ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board, and in the strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance to which every other consideration must give way."

ADMIRAL VISCOUNT KEITH *in* 1803.

"But at this instant to rush into the interior of Spain [England] without any organised centre or magazines, with hostile armies on one's flank and in one's rear, would be an attempt without precedent in the history of the world. . . . According to the laws of war, every general who loses his line of communication deserves death."—NAPOLEON.

HOWEVER much the desire to take England

by surprise may necessitate rapidity in the execution of a German plan of invasion, the plan itself will have been prepared long beforehand; and, having regard to the known thoroughness of German ways and works, it is only fair to assume that all the difficulties of such an unprecedented undertaking will have been ascertained and carefully weighed before the details of that plan were worked out. No access to it is possible, but the geographical and nautical facts on which it must be based are open to the inquirer, and in studying them we shall be able to form an opinion as to what that plan ought, or, at least, what it ought not, to be.

It is evident that the first point on which a German Government desirous of invading England must make up its mind, is the place where its army shall land. London, of course, will be its objective, for only by seizing the centre of Great Britain's life can it hope to paralyse British resistance; therefore, the

nearer to London that landing place, the better. This conclusion points to the south coast of England, but the Straits of Dover bar the way, for whatever our despondent prophets may be pleased to predict, German naval authorities will never trust so implicitly to the carelessness and stupidity of ours, as to dare to send an enormous fleet of transports, escorted by all Germany's warships, through a passage only twenty-four miles wide. We may be fools, but it is part of the alarmist creed that the Germans are not, so our south coast may be reckoned as safe from attack.

The east coast of Scotland and the east coast of England north of the Wash, as too far from London, must also be ruled out, and we have, therefore, to find a landing-place for our invaders between the Wash and the Straits of Dover. Of the southern part of this district, Lieutenant Dewar tells us that "the estuaries and flats of the Thames have

been used by some novel-writers for landing troops, but it is doubtful whether any one else would use them for this purpose. The approach to the small rivers is difficult, and Sheerness and Harwich, with their quota of torpedo craft a couple of hours off, would loom over any attempt in that area."[1]

This verdict, and it is one that every experienced officer, naval or military, will confirm, further limits our choice to the portion of the coast lying between the Witham, on the north side of the Wash, and the Stour, along which "there are beaches and small harbours such as Yarmouth suitable enough, but still rather too close to Harwich to be comfortable."[2]

I doubt the epithet *suitable* really applying to any of the harbours, for they all lie up shallow rivers difficult to navigate even by small ships at low water, inaccessible to large

[1] *Is Invasion Impossible?* pp. 35, 36.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 36.

vessels at all states of the tide, and as all experienced embarkation officers will agree with Lieutenant Dewar that "it is very doubtful whether a force of any size would ever attempt to land on a beach,"[1] it follows that the German Government, at the very outset, must have found itself impaled on the horns of a dilemma, since its choice lay between a suitable harbour which it could not discover, and an open beach on which no experienced officer would counsel it to land its troops; and even if a suitable harbour could have been found, there was the probability that it would be so defended with mines as to render a rapid *coup de main* almost impossible.[2]

It looks, therefore, as if Germany's plans for an invasion of England must be lying in

[1] *Is Invasion Impossible?* p. 35.

[2] "Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid *coup de main* against any important port almost an impossibility."—*Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p. 260, by Julian S. Corbett, LL.M.

a pigeon-hole with the word *impracticable* written large across it; but to help a timid and easily deceived British public to realise to the full the folly of its fears, we will assume that German naval officers have given their voice in favour of landing on a beach, and do our best to find one suitable to the purpose.

To accommodate 246,000 men, 78,000 horses, 864 guns, 13,200 vehicles, such a beach must be, at least, from 12 to 15 miles long; it should have a firm sandy bottom, plentiful supplies of good water at intervals along its whole length, and it should be in the vicinity of a good-sized town, the larger the better, where fresh food and labour, skilled and unskilled, and the hundred and one things that an army, cut off from its own country, would soon find itself in need of, could be procured, and where the sick and wounded could be properly housed—in a word, a town fitted to serve as a base for

subsequent land operations. There should also be a strong position at a convenient distance from the beach, the occupation of which would give some security to the army, whilst engaged in the complicated process of landing.

Now, no beach on the east coast of England answers to this description; but a German army corps on the march, with its first and second lines of transport, stretches 32 miles[1]; consequently each army corps would require a road to itself,[2] and what

[1] On a good high-road, a German Army Corps in ordinary order of march would cover 32 miles, exclusive of intervals between échelons, that is, intervals between the larger units of the Army, and those between the combatants and the first and second lines of transport:

| | |
|---|---|
| 25 Battalions of Infantry, 6 Squadrons of Cavalry, and 24 Batteries of Artillery cover . . . | $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles |
| First line of Transport, Ammunition and Supply Columns . . . . . | $12\frac{1}{2}$ ,, |
| Second Line of Transport . . . . . | $4\frac{3}{4}$ ,, |
| Total | $32\frac{3}{4}$ ,, |

See *Duties of the General Staff*, by General Bronsart von Schellendorff, pp. 349, 350.

[2] Without taking into account the second line of transport, which would be left in rear, an army corps with

our invaders must discover is not one beach fifteen miles long, but six beaches two and a half miles long, each possessing all the attributes detailed above, and, in addition, good anchorage in deep water, "for, no matter what may be the advantages offered on shore, unless there is good anchorage and deep water near shore, no place can be deemed a good one for the disembarkation of an army." [1]

Assuming that these six suitable landing-places exist, we will now turn to the consideration of the difficulties that will be met with in the attempt to reach them.

There is the weather—any one can see

its first line of transport—that is, with its ammunition columns and trains—would, *when advancing by one road*, require from twelve to twenty hours, according to circumstances, to march a distance of fourteen miles, and deploy into line of battle. "This, then, at once gives us the *maximum* force that should be moved by *one* road [the troops being at full war-strength], if it is at once to engage the enemy, or to be drawn up in position ready for battle."—*Duties of the General Staff*, by General Bronsart von Schellendorff, pp. 353, 354.

[1] Lord Wolseley's *Soldiers' Pocket-book*, p. 223.

that good weather will be essential to the success of such an enormous combined movement as that of three fleets, sailing from three ports, timed to arrive together at a point over 250 miles away; yet who can guarantee that the weather will be fine? The North Sea has a bad reputation; according to Colonel P. H. N. Lake, in summer and autumn one day in five "there would be a swell or other difficulties of the sea to prevent a disembarkation, and about one day in twenty, in addition, when the sea is seriously rough, and vessels would not care to lie off a lee-shore"[1]; and if he is right—and most sailors will, I think, agree with him—it will be no easy matter to fix a starting-day for the German Expedition.

Then there are fogs: fogs, of course, go with a smooth sea, and, as we know, Lord Roberts reckons them as a factor favourable

[1] Evidence given before the Norfolk Commission, vol. i, p. 103 [Cd. 2062, 1904].

o our invaders, but captains and crews egard them with hearty disfavour; and if ingle ships go cautiously, feeling their way hrough their blinding veil, and giving notice f their whereabouts by incessant blowing of heir horns, how much more bewildering and larming must that veil be to a large number f vessels sailing in company, and how loud he notes of warning by which each would ry to keep clear of all the rest; and even if hey succeed in this endeavour and escape unning each other down, disembarkation nust wait till the veil lifts.

Those foghorns would not tend to the naintenance of that secrecy on which the uccess of the expedition depends, and if here were no fog, "as all the ships will be bliged to carry lights for mutual safety, they vill be visible nearly as far by night as by lay. How can they hope to escape dis-overy?"[1]

[1] *Admiralty Memorandum*, see Appendix.

The answer to this question is clear enough—the expedition would not escape discovery, and as both sides to the Invasion Controversy agree that, if its coming were known it would come in vain, we are once again driven to the conclusion that no such expedition will ever threaten our shores; nevertheless, for the sake of the lessons to be learnt from following its fortunes to the end, we will allow the three German flotillas to sail from their respective ports, pass safely through the sand-banks and shallows which shut in Germany's coast,[1] and issue out into the North Sea. Here the troopships must be got into something like a compact forma-

[1] On this coast the sands are constantly shifting and the courses of the rivers changing, which "explain, in conjunction with the frequent bad weather, the dense fogs, and the severe storms, the numerous accidents reported in the Press which occur in our German North Sea river-mouths, but . . . they afford at the same time most valuable protection to the trade centres and naval ports situated on them."—"The Defence of the German Coasts," translated from *Die Grenzboten*, No. 3, of January 17, 1912. See *Journal Royal United Service Institution* for June 1912.

tion—a difficult matter, having regard to their different sizes and powers, and to the rule that the speed of the slowest must determine the pace.[1] Not being a sailor, I shall not attempt to decide whether the three fleets will merge into one, protected by all Germany's cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo-boats, or whether each fleet will sail independently, escorted by its own quota of warships of every kind.

But most naval officers will, I think, agree with General Bronsart von Schellendorff that a troopship to-day "is quite defenceless when opposed to a modern man-of-war, which can sink it without difficulty. Troopships must therefore keep outside the range of an enemy's guns or torpedoes. For this reason it is very inadvisable that a fleet of

[1] "It will be borne in mind that a body of transports is always a tactical weakness in the day of battle, and will probably lower the fleet speed of a number of high-powered ships-of-war."—*Naval Strategy*, p. 265, by Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy.

transports should be escorted by the battle fleet to protect it against the enemy's ships. A naval engagement under these conditions would be the more serious, as the battle fleet would be deprived of its freedom of manœuvre by the fleet of transports. The decisive naval engagement must be fought out by the battle fleet alone." [1]

But whatever the formation adopted, the area will be very large, and the difficulty of affording adequate defence to the troopships correspondingly great; whereas the British attack, delivered by far more numerous destroyers and other small craft, though only supported by half the men-of-war that ought to be on guard, would be

[1] *The Duties of the General Staff*, pp. 553, 554. On the "Conduct of Expeditions," Julian Corbett writes: "Against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an over-sea expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war."—*Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p. 310.

very strong, since it could be concentrated on any point or points that should appear most vulnerable. I know that the assumption underlying the whole discreditable scare, is that there will be no attack; that all our sailors will be blind, all our captains and admirals dupes; and that an armada, far exceeding in strength that Spanish Fleet which found its grave in northern seas, flying from the shores of the land it came to conquer, will reach those same shores intact, because invisible. I know, too, that the reverse of all these anticipations would be true.

A British attack would certainly be made; there might, or might not, be a great general engagement, or in such engagement our Fleet might suffer as heavily as the German Fleet; but with the transports spread over many square miles, one after the other would find itself cut off from its defenders, and go to the bottom, sunk by cannon shot or torpedo, or, disabled and leaking, would lie helpless, look-

ing to friend or foe to bring them into safety, whilst those that escaped destruction or disablement would steer for German harbours, not for an English beach, since it is the whole expeditionary force, not a part of it, that must land, if the march on London is not to end before it has begun.[1]

That is what would really happen, but once again, accepting the impossible, we will assume that, one summer's morning, six German flotillas, each carrying an army corps, will be lying at anchor, off the landing-

[1] When, in 1744, Marshal Saxe's Army threatened these shores, Admiral Sir John Norris's plan for frustrating the invasion was as follows: "As I think it [so he wrote to the Admiralty] of the greatest consequence to His Majesty's service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, I have . . . determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in. But if they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night and go northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my squadron either fight the French Fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation [that is, the transports conveying the troops] with all my strength."

places assigned to them, and ask ourselves—what next? Certainly not what the scare-mongers would have us believe—a landing one day, a rush on London the next. There can be no flinging of men and horses on shore; slowly, laboriously, in carefully arranged order of precedence, the contents of the transports must be conveyed to the beach. The main body of Infantry first, to protect the landing of the horses, guns, wagons, stores, etc.—for now, at last, all hope of concealment has vanished, and every step will be taken as in the presence of an enemy, beginning with the position taken up by the troopships, which must lie well out of range of field Artillery, though every furlong farther off land will be a handicap.[1]

It will be no light task to put 41,000 men, at each of the six landing-places, nearly

[1] "The greater range of modern artillery compels the transports to anchor further away from the shore than obtained in past days."—*Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas*, by Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B., p. 289.

half of them undisciplined, into boats tossing about in a restless sea, but that will be easy work compared to the labour of the lowering into them of horses and guns and wagons, with no mechanical appliances save those which the ships can furnish; and that labour and those difficulties will be multiplied a hundred-fold when it comes to transferring the contents of the boats to the beach, with no appliances of any kind, only ropes and men's hands to carry out the operation. Terrified, sick, shaken, the horses may yet be coaxed, or coerced into wading or swimming ashore; but how are the guns, how are the wagons, to be lifted out and dragged through the shingle and sand, into which the wheels of the latter will sink up to their axles?

And how, if the day proves the one out of five when "a swell or other difficulties of the sea" would prevent a disembarkation, or the one day in twenty when "vessels would

not care to lie off a lee-shore," or when a fog should enshroud them ?[1] Such accidents may be eliminated in planning a hypothetical invasion, but assuredly they will have been taken into account in the planning of a real one.[2]

But something worse than the fear of unfriendly weather will overshadow the work of disembarkation, and spur to a haste which can only create confusion—that something, the certainty that the alarm has been

[1] *A sudden fog occurred during the Invasion Test at the Manœuvres in July* 1912. "Meanwhile Red had made a dash for Filey, and was near shore, protected from sudden attack by a screen of cruisers, *when down came a thick fog, rendering the landing of the expeditionary force impossible.*"—The Naval Correspondent of *Daily News and Leader*, July 22, 1912.

[2] The German Military Authorities are quite alive to such accidents, and in planning an invasion of this country would certainly not overlook risks which neither foresight nor skill could avert. Mark what General Bronsart von Schellendorff says on the subject: "Further, it is necessary to be clear upon the point that any landing on an open coast is so dependent upon the weather, that the attempt may not only be undesirably delayed, but may even have to be given up altogether."—*The Duties of the General Staff*, p. 554.

given, and that every British battleship and cruiser, every British destroyer, torpedo boat, and submarine that wireless telegraphy can summon, is hurrying towards the east coast, and may, at any moment, come into sight. Long before the last German soldier has set foot on land, one by one they will rise above the horizon, and the transports will find themselves in worse plight than had they been attacked in the open sea; for, caught between the British Fleets and the shore, they can no longer disperse in all directions. How many of these unhappy vessels will sink with troops and horses on board; how many suffer capture, or make good their escape, leaving troops and horses behind them on the beach; how many British ships will perish in destroying the German Fleet, it is impossible to predict; but one thing is certain, the end of the struggle will find us still in command of the sea, and Germany with no second fleet in her

harbours to send to the help or rescue of the remnants of her expedition. Cut off from their base, with no hope of reinforcements and no line of retreat, those remnants can but surrender to the enormously superior forces that will be brought against them; for, however much the friends of conscription may belittle our present military arrangements, they will hardly contend that 464,487 fighting men are incapable of dealing with a broken and disheartened Army. Fortunately for the Germans and fortunately for ourselves, we shall never be called upon to deal with a stranded German army, for even the slight indications of the difficulties attendant on an oversea expedition on a vast scale that I have laid before my readers, prove that at no state of its development could it and its objective have been concealed from the knowledge of the whole world, and such knowledge is all that is needed to ensure its failure. Every

concession that I have made to bring an enemy's forces to our shore has been a denial of that enemy's foresight, knowledge and common sense—qualities in which the German people are not deficient.

The difficulties and dangers which our authorities see clearly, must be equally visible to theirs; not one of these difficulties, of that we may be sure, has been overlooked; and we may be equally certain that the German Government, with the reports of its experts before it, will never run the risks of which we are asked to believe they think so lightly.

To sum up:

1. England holds a perfect strategical position, of which nothing can deprive her.

2. The half of her battleships and cruisers in the Home and Irish waters, is stronger than the whole of the German Navy of the same class of ships in the North Sea and Baltic; and in the small craft—specially useful

for intercepting transports conveying troops, and for harbour and coast defence—her superiority is nearly as 2 to 1.

3. All experts agree that so long as her regular Army is at home, no foreign Power will venture to invade her, also that her Army will never be sent abroad till she has gained full command of the sea, *i.e.* till she is in a position to seal up the harbours of any would-be invaders.

4. Only a surprise expedition could hope to reach her shores.

5. Neither Germany nor any other Power can take her by surprise, because the organisation of an oversea expedition on a large scale—and no other has a chance of success—is a lengthy and difficult business, involving action which could not be concealed; the attempt to hide what would be going on in her ports being in itself a betrayal of hostile intentions.

6. Germany *cannot* organise such an

expedition, either openly or in secret, because she has not sufficient shipping to convey 246,000 men with their *impedimenta*, and all the guns, and horses, and military carriage across the North Sea; and she *will* not organise it, because her Government knows the facts on which I base my conclusions a great deal better than many Englishmen seem to do, and because, though she, like this country, may contain a sprinkling of foolish or unscrupulous persons, her people as a whole are sensible and honest. Why, then, live in terror of a neighbour who cannot harm us if she would, and who, in my opinion, has no wish to do so, though her Government may play upon our fears for the sake of some advantages which it thinks she can extort from them? If that is Germany's policy, surely ours is to convince her that we entertain no fears for her to play on, that we know our strength, and that, however far from all desire to use it to her detriment, we can and

will maintain our Naval supremacy, a supremacy on which, as the world is at present constituted, our whole national life depends. Germany's Fleet may, or may not, be a luxury ; ours is the condition on which we hold not only our Empire, but our daily bread.

# CHAPTER VIII

## CONCLUSION

"There be many examples where sea-fights have been fina in the war, . . . but this much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will; whereas those that be strongest on land are many times, nevertheless, in great straits."—BACON.

"No armed millions can save her, no matter under what conditions they are raised and trained; nothing can save Great Britain but her Navy, and on that rests what may be called her credit-note, not only in Europe, but throughout the world."

*The United Service Gazette, June* 27, 1912.

"We, the British Isles, must keep ourselves free from entangling alliances in Europe, first, because they would involve us in the military rivalries of Continental Powers and deflect our policy from its normal course, and secondly because such alliances and their responsibilities would be an obstacle to closer Imperial Federation."

ARCHIBALD HURD.

THE foregoing pages have been written in no spirit of boasting or national arrogance, but in the hope of dissipating an illusion which is doing incalculable harm both to England and Germany, and of giving the *coup de grâce* to

certain ambitious schemes which, dimly suspected by the people of both countries, tend to destroy and embitter relations that, in the true interests of each, should always be open and friendly.

With this object in view, I have stated frankly and fully the strategical advantages inherent in Great Britain's geographical position, and set forth her great superiority in ships, sailors, and armament. It is no insult to Germany to show her that she cannot hope to rival us on the sea, and to point out the futility of her attempts to create a Navy equal to ours, since her inferiority is due not to any defect in her people, to any weakness in her Government, but to the limitations imposed upon her by Nature.

On the other hand, it is not pandering to the jingo spirit in my own countrymen to compel them to recognise their great naval strength, for the facts and arguments by which I have disproved the possibility of a

German invasion of England, demonstrate our weakness for attack, and the futility of cherishing the ambition of playing an active part on land in any future European war. People may talk glibly of creating a Striking Force, Ministers may adopt the term, but the thing itself can never come into existence, for the simple reason that long before such a force could be thrown into the scales of war, the decisive battle would have been fought, unless, indeed, it were so small as to be a negligible quantity.

It is well that France, too, should recognise this fact and cease to hope for effective British military aid in any future struggle with Germany; and it is well for her, well for Germany, and well for England, to understand that in sealing Germany's ports—the only helpful step we could take as France's ally—we should be drying up a large part of our own trade, and creating a fierce reaction against engagements by which we stand to

lose much, and to gain nothing ; for in what respect should we be the better for the crippling of a great and, in many directions, the most advanced nation in the world ?

I am not one of those who believe that this earth was intended by God to be a cockpit to the end of time ; but I know that so long as the cockpit view of the world continues dominant, there will be constant changes in the nations pitted against each other. I therefore deprecate any policy based on the assumption that France will always be our friend and Germany always our foe, and I desire to see a return to that independent position in which all our arrangements can be based upon our own needs—safety for our island home, protection for our trade, and uninterrupted, uninterruptible communication with India and our Colonies.

The Navy necessary to the maintenance of such a position would not necessarily be a menace to any other nation, and it is not

demanding too much of Germany to ask her to recognise that, till the affairs of the world are managed on better principles than those prevailing at the present time, we cannot have the supremacy of the sea, on which the conditions of our national existence depend, wrested from us, nor allow it to slip from our hands.

Such a recognition would do much to bring her people and ours into stable relations, and pave the way to a relaxation of the cruel pressure put upon both countries by a rivalry which, however far it may be carried, will do nothing to alter their relative naval strength.

# APPENDIX

## THE ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 19TH, 1910, ON THE RISK OF INVASION

THE really serious danger that this country has to guard against in war is not invasion, but interruption of our trade and destruction of our Merchant Shipping.

The strength of our Fleet is determined by what is necessary to protect our trade, and, if it is sufficient for that, it will be almost necessarily sufficient to prevent invasion, since the same disposition of the ships to a great extent answers both purposes.

The main object aimed at by our Fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she is brought to action. Any disposition that is even moderately successful in attaining this object will almost certainly be effective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from reaching our shores.

To realise the difficulty that an enemy would have in bringing such a fleet of transports to our coast and disembarking an army, it is necessary to remember that all the ships operating in Home waters, whether they are in the North Sea, the Channel, or elsewhere, are in wireless communication with the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, so that if a fleet of transports is sighted anywhere by a single cruiser, or even by a merchant ship if she is fitted with wireless, every ship which happened to be in a position to intercept the transports would at once get the order to concentrate as necessary for the purpose, whether she was at sea or in harbour.

It is further necessary to remember that, even supposing that by some extraordinary lucky chance the transports were able to reach our coast without being detected, their presence must be known when they arrive there; and long before half the troops could be landed, the transports would be attacked and sunk by submarines which are stationed along the coast for that purpose.

Besides the submarines there would be always a large force of destroyers, either in the ports along the coast or within wireless call, as, in addition to those that may be definitely detailed for coast defence, the system of reliefs for those acting over

sea will ensure a large number being actually in harbour at their respective bases, or within call while going to or returning from their stations.

These destroyers, though not specially stationed with that object, will always form, in conjunction with submarines, a very effective second line of defence in the improbable event of such a second line being required.

To understand thoroughly the small chance of an invasion from the other side of the North Sea being successful, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of the officer who has to undertake the responsibility of conducting it.

His first difficulty will be to consider how he is to get his great fleet of transports to sea without any information of it leaking out through neutral nations or otherwise.

Next, he will consider that somewhere within wireless call we have nearly double the number of battleships and cruisers that he can muster, besides a swarm of destroyers.

He has probably very vague and unreliable information as to their positions, which are constantly changing.

His unwieldy fleet will cover many square miles of water, and as all the ships will be obliged to carry lights for mutual safety, they will be visible

nearly as far by night as by day. How can he hope to escape discovery?

Many of his transports will have speeds of not more than ten to twelve knots, so that there will be no hope for escape by flight if he is met by a superior force.

If he is sighted by any of our destroyers at night, they will have little difficulty in avoiding the men-of-war and torpedoing the transports.

Is it possible to entice part of our Fleet away by any stratagem? Possibly. But even if he succeeds in drawing off half our Fleet, the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports, even if supported by the strongest Fleet he could collect. The Fleets would engage each other while the destroyers and submarines torpedoed the transports.

Finally, even if he reached the coast in safety, he would see that it was quite impossible to guard his transports against the attacks of submarines while he was landing the troops; and that it was quite certain that a superior force would be brought to attack him before the landing could be completed.

Taking all these facts into consideration, he would probably decide, as the Admiralty have done, that an invasion on even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible.

# INDEX

"Admiral" (*The Times*, November 1908), on the invasion scare, 47
Admiralty (British), estimates of tonnage required to convey Army Corps, 90; Memorandum of November 1910 on risk of invasion, 141–4
Ardagh, Major-General Sir John, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., on surprise invasion of England, 50
Armoured Cruisers, number of British, 12 *et seq.*; number of German, 15 *et seq.*
Army, British, strength of, 64; Reserve, number of, 64
Army Corps, strength of German, 70, 76; mobilisation, 97; concentration, 104; embarkation, 107; length of road required by German, 118
Atlantic Ocean (Irish waters), statistics of British Fleet in, 13, 16, 62

Balfour, Mr. A. J., on invasion, 39
Baltic Sea, statistics of, German Fleet in, 15, 17, 62
Battleships, number of British, 12 *et seq.*; number of German, 15 *et seq.*
Beresford, Lord Charles, on efficient seamen, 28 *n.*
Brassey, Lord, on "scrapping" war-vessels, 18 *n.*
Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, on invasion, 56
Broadside fire of British and German Fleets in North Sea compared, 21

Cavalry with invading force, necessity for, 77; duties of, 78
Churchill, Major A. B. N., on "commerce destroying," 7 *n.*
Clarke, Major F. C. H., C.M.G., on tonnage allowance for sea-transport of troops, 87 *n.*; on material required for landing troops, 103 *n.*
Coast Guard, British, number of, 64
Concentration, operation discussed, 104–7
Corbett, Julian S., LL.M., on mines, 116; on the conduct of expeditions, 124 *n.*

Cruisers, number of British, 12 *et seq.*; number of German, 15 *et seq.*

Defending force (British), strength of, 64, 65
Destroyers, number of British, 12 *et seq.*; number of German, 15 *et seq.*; use of, in repelling invasion, 143
Dewar, Lieutenant A. C., R.N., on boats required for landing forces, 104 *n.*; on landing-place for invading force, 114–6
Displacement of British and German Fleets in North Sea compared, 20
Dockyards (for Dreadnought class) of Great Britain and Germany compared, 23

Embarkation, operation discussed, 107–11
England, invasion scare, 35–59; presumable conditions under which invasion will be undertaken, 60. *See also* Great Britain
English Channel, statistics of British Fleet in, 14, 16, 62

Fleet, British, strength and disposition in European waters, 10–34; in Mediterranean Sea, 12; in Atlantic Ocean (Irish waters), 13, 16, 62; in English Channel, 14, 16, 62; in North Sea, 14, 16; displacement and average tonnage of, in North Sea, 20; broadside fire of, in North Sea, 21; its object, 141. *See also* Navy, British
Fleet, German, strength and disposition in European waters, 10–34; in Baltic Sea, 15, 17, 62; in North Sea, 15, 17, 62; displacement and average tonnage of, in North Sea, 20; broadside fire of, in North Sea, 21. *See also* Navy, German.
Fogs in North Sea, 120
Furse, Colonel G. A., C.B., on tonnage allowance for sea-transport of troops, 88, 90; on sufferings of horses at sea, 102 *n.*; on fresh-water supply, 108 *n.*

Germany, strategical position, 8; Navy compared with Great Britain's, 18–34, 62; dockyard statistics, 23; merchantship statistics, 25; personnel of Navy, 28; military force compared with British, 63 *et seq.*; her soldiers compared with British, 68; Peace Establishment, strength of, 70; Army Corps, strength of, 70, 76; statistics of shipping tonnage, 85; tonnage required to convey invading force, 90; mobilisation difficulties, 98; concentration difficulties, 105; embarkation difficulties, 107; presumable plan of invasion

discussed, 113; its choice of a landing-place for its expeditionary force, 113; reasons for believing an invasion of England impossible, 132. *See also* Fleet, German
Great Britain, strategical position, 1–9; resources for defence, 2–4; naval policy, 11; Navy compared with Germany's, 18–34, 62; dockyard statistics, 23; merchant-ship statistics, 25; personnel of Navy, 28; and the invasion scare, 35–59; military force compared with Germany's, 63 *et seq.*; strength of defending force, 64; her soldiers compared with Germany's, 68; effect on ports of invading force, 83; tonnage required to convey Army Corps, 90; presumable plan for invasion of, 113; presumable landing-place of invading force, 113; reasons for believing invasion impossible, 132. *See also* Fleet, British

Hamilton, Admiral Sir Vesey, on Lord Roberts's invasion scare, 46
Hopkins, Admiral Sir John Ommanney, G.C.B., on invasion of England, 55
Horses, transport of, by sea, 100; sufferings of, at sea, 102 *n.*
Howard of Effingham, Lord, on strategy (1588), 6 *n.*

Invading Force, constitution of, 60–81; number of troops required, 63; land-transport and supply of, 70 *et seq.*; sea-transport of, 82–95; effect on British ports of, 83; shipping tonnage required for, 90; boats required for landing, 102; probable landing-place, 113
Invasion of England, presumable conditions under which it will be undertaken, 60; presumable plan for, 113; summary of difficulties to be met, 143
— Scare, The, 35–59

Lake, Colonel P. H. N., C.B., on surprise invasion of England, 50; on weather in the North Sea, 120
Landing-place of invading force, the presumable, 113; accommodation required in a, 117
Land-transport and supply of invading force, 70 *et seq.*

Mahan, Captain A. T., D.C.L., LL.D., on obsolete vessels, 19; on transports in naval battle, 123 *n.*
Marines, Royal, British, number of, 64
"Master Mariner" (*Contemporary Review*, March 1911) on preparation of ships for sea, 85 *n.*
Mediterranean Sea, statistics of British Fleet in, 12

Memorandum of British Admiralty on risk of invasion, 141–4
Merchant ships, statistics of British and German, 25; reported to carry armaments, 26
Militia, British, number of, 64; Reserve, 64
Mobilisation, operation discussed, 97–104
"Modern Mariner" (*The Times*, November 1908) on invasion scare, 42 *n.*

Napier, Sir Charles, quotation from his *Indian Mismanagement*, 11
Napoleon I. on strategy, 5
National Reserve, British, number of, 64
Navy, British, strength of, 12 *et seq.*; personnel, 28. *See also* Fleet, British
— German, strength of, 15 *et seq.*; personnel, 28. *See also* Fleet, German
Nicholson, Lieut.-General Sir William, K.C.B., on surprise invasion of England, 49, 50; on security of England from invasion, 52
Non-combatants, statistics regarding, 72; their duties, 73
Norfolk Royal Commission, 38, 49 *et seq.*, 77
Norris, Admiral Sir John, plan for frustrating invasion (1744), 126 *n.*
North Sea, statistics of British Fleet in, 14, 16; statistics of German Fleet in, 15, 17, 62; displacement and average tonnage of British and German Fleets in, 20; broadside fire of British and German Fleets in, 21; weather conditions in, 120
"Nucleus crew," Mr. Balfour's description of, 16

Peace Establishment, German, 70
Personnel of British and German Navies compared, 28
Protected Cruisers, number of British, 12 *et seq.*; number of German, 15 *et seq.*
Pustau, Captain von, on the British seaman, 30 *n.*

Roberts, Earl, on invasion of England, 41–4, 51; on maintenance of Citizen Army, 44 *n.*; conditions under which he presumes England will be invaded, 61, 71 *n.*; on transport of horses by sea, 100
Royal Commission on the risk of invasion, 38, 49 *et seq.*, 77
— Marines, British, number of, 64

Sailing vessels, British use of, in over-sea expeditions, 86 *n.*
Sailors, statistics of, British and German Navies, 28
Schellendorff, General Bronsart von, on strategy, 7 *n.*; on

the transport of troops, 43, 44; on vehicles requisite for attacking force, 73; on remounts, food, and forage, 75; on constitution of an army, 76 *n.*; on the necessity for cavalry, 77 *n.*; on transport of horses by sea, 101 *n.*; on difficulties of concentration, 105, 106; on time and length of road required by Army Corps to deploy, 118 *n.*; on troopships in naval battle, 123; on the necessity for good weather when landing troops, 129 *n.*

Scouts, number of British, in home waters, 14, 16

Sea-transport of invading force, 82-95

Skeleton, or maintenance, crew, description of, 16

Soldiers, comparison of British and German, 68

Submarines, number of British, 18; number of German, 18; use of, in repelling invasion, 143

Supply and land-transport of invading force, 70 *et seq.*

Territorial Force, British, number of, 64

*Times* Correspondent for Naval Affairs on invasion scare, 59

Tonnage of Germany's shipping, 85; amount required for invading force, 86; relation of net to gross, 89

Torpedo Boats, number of British, 18; number of German, 18

Turner, Major-General Sir Alfred, K.C.B., on invasion of England, 54

United Kingdom. *See* Great Britain

Weather conditions required by invading force, 119

Weight of armaments of the rival Fleets in the North Sea, 15

Wilson, Sir Arthur, on sufficiency of our Fleet to prevent invasion, 57

Wireless telegraphy, its use in repelling invasion, 142

Wolseley, Lord, on risk of invasion, 51; on tonnage allowance for sea-transport of troops, 87

## PRESS OPINIONS ON THE FIRST VOLUME OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"

THE TIMES.—"Now that opinion in regard to Indian frontier policy has undergone a marked change, Colonel H. B. Hanna's careful study of the events which led up to the Second Afghan War is distinctly opportune. . . . From first to last, the book will well repay study by every one who cares to understand how wars can be made—and avoided."

THE OBSERVER.—"We know of no one better qualified to deal with events in Afghanistan than Colonel H. B. Hanna."

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—"Colonel Hanna's tremendous care, completeness and clearness, with his intense conviction, make him a very powerful writer."

ATHENÆUM.—"The ability with which his case is presented is considerable, and it is probable that in his main line his view is a well-founded one."

MORNING LEADER.—"Colonel Hanna is peculiarly well fitted to handle the multiplicity of questions—political, military, financial, and social—that arise in connection with the Second Afghan War."

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.—"Colonel Hanna calls his book, of which the first volume has now been published, *The Second Afghan War*; but its scope is wider than the title. . . . The present volume justifies the hope that the work when completed will possess the highest political value. Colonel Hanna brings to his task a mind imbued with Liberal principles, as well as an almost unrivalled knowledge of the frontier-problem in its military and political aspects."

LEEDS MERCURY.—"Colonel Hanna's work promises to be the standard authority on the history of the Second Afghan War. It is

written with conspicuous ability, and with a manifest desire to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, regarding one of the most senseless wars of aggression recorded in the annals of the British Empire."

ADVOCATE OF INDIA.—"Colonel Hanna shows clearly and forcibly, and with the aid of unimpeachable authorities, that on the brink of war the army was found thoroughly incapable of effectual warfare."

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.—"This is a remarkable, an excellent, and a most interestingly instructive work; and the second volume when it appears will be eagerly seized upon by all readers of that which has now been published. . . . The volume before us is a most masterly exposition of the subject with which it deals, and cannot be too strongly recommended."

MANCHESTER COURIER.—"The present volume ends at the moment of the advance, and we shall therefore look eagerly for the continuation of the story. If it is continued in the same exhaustive and judicial manner as it has commenced, Colonel Hanna will have made a notable and valuable contribution to modern Indian history."

INVESTORS' REVIEW.—"Nothing is set down in it haphazard, nothing from mere impulse or passion. It is a calm and almost colourless . . . narrative of facts based upon documents accessible to all."

GLASGOW HERALD.—"The author writes with a very thorough knowledge of the subject; his facts are marshalled with remarkable skill, and his argumentation is exceptionally vigorous. These qualities mark his book as a valuable contribution towards the adequate understanding of a question which has not yet lost its importance."

WESTERN MAIL, CARDIFF.—"Colonel Hanna tells his story in a style that makes interesting reading, whilst the sidelights are of a character that one would not miss willingly. As it is, we think there should be a hearty welcome for the volume issued because of its general interest."

THE ARMY AND NAVY GAZETTE.—"Colonel Hanna's book, the first volume of which was published on Thursday last, has come opportunely. It fairly shows that we have, as regards Afghan affairs, consistently done what we ought not to have done, and left undone or left unsaid many things that belonged to our peace."

THE LITERARY WORLD.—"A work like Colonel Hanna's appeals specially to the student, particularly to the political and military student."

SHEFFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH.—"All who take an earnest and continuous interest in British operations on the North-West Indian Frontier . . . will do well to get Colonel Hanna's book."

WESTERN MERCURY.—"This bulky volume is a crushing and remorseless exposure of the 'Forward Policy.' Colonel Hanna . . . has, in addition to military knowledge, tireless industry and a firm grip of facts."

PUBLIC OPINION.—"We heartily recommend this very able history of events that have proved so costly to England in lives and money. The work is well written, and should be widely read."

NEWCASTLE LEADER.—"Such a task as Colonel Hanna has undertaken requires not only the faculty of the historian, but the special training of the soldier for its effective treatment; and Colonel Hanna has both this historic ability and this special training."

THE CHAMPION, BOMBAY.—"Colonel Hanna has already won his spurs as a writer and publicist of no mean renown, on questions relating to the Afghan and North-West Frontier politics, and he has well been described by one leading London journal as 'peculiarly fitted to handle the multiplicity of questions—political, social, and military—in connection with the Second Afghan War,' and by another as bringing to his task 'care, clearness, completeness and conviction. We entirely concur in these views."

THE WORLD.—"The first volume . . . is now published, and contains a full and interesting account of the various events which led to the genesis and growth of the Forward Policy, and so to the outbreak of war, which the next volume is to chronicle."

LIVERPOOL POST.—"Especially valuable is Colonel Hanna's analysis of the circumstances attending the Russian Mission to Kabul, under General Stolietoff, which have been put forward by apologists of Lord Lytton and the Beaconsfield Government as an ample justification of the Afghan War."

## PRESS OPINIONS ON THE SECOND VOLUME OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—"Colonel Hanna may be congratulated on an extremely accurate, painstaking, and clear account of a very unsatisfactory war. His criticisms . . . are, we believe, generally sound."

MORNING POST.—"No one could be more capable of writing a history of it than Colonel Hanna."

EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS.—"Few books have ever given a better description of mountain warfare and its perils, and how a rough country tends to dislocate military movements, while there are some life-like passages descriptive of the frequent raids on the British lines of communications by the wild tribesmen."

SCOTSMAN.—"This volume effectively brings up a valuable military history which has already in its first half gained a high reputation among the studious soldiers best capable of weighing its merits."

INDIA.—"A searching, uncompromising and illuminating piece of historical work."

SHEFFIELD DAILY INDEPENDENT.—"To give a lucid account of this tangled campaign is no easy matter; but Colonel Hanna has been successful."

MORNING LEADER.—"The tale is told, both from the military and the political points of view, with a moderation, a strict impartiality, and a scrupulous regard for accuracy which win and hold the confidence of the reader."

MANCHESTER COURIER.—"The story is clear and sufficient and no extraneous matter is included."

SHEFFIELD TELEGRAPH.—"Most chapters of the narrative close with 'Observations' or criticisms, which, whether justified or not, cannot but make a soldier think out carefully the problems set before him. This is a work which could only be done by one who is himself a scientific soldier, and is well acquainted with the country about which he writes."

HUDDERSFIELD EXAMINER.—"The combination of soldier and historian, still more of the soldier and liberal-minded historian, is one that is only too rare in the annals of publication."

LITERARY WORLD.—"Colonel Hanna writes clearly and effectively, and, more especially in the descriptive parts of his narrative, we are impressed by the fact that he writes with sufficiency and knowledge."

THE SPEAKER.—"For soldiers the volume is full of instruction. Besides containing a clear account of each action and expedition, to most of the descriptive chapters is appended a series of observations, each of which is a carefully considered criticism on the events discussed in the preceding pages."

THE SATURDAY REVIEW.—"Military students will thank Colonel Hanna most for his analyses, and will enjoy his sound and judicial weighing and comparison of means to an end. . . . Colonel Hanna has written a very able book and has the courage of his convictions, a welcome trait in these days when robust opinions are largely out of fashion.'

## PRESS OPINIONS ON THE THIRD VOLUME OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—"That the author, an actual participator in the long-protracted struggle of thirty and more years ago, has been spared to complete the work to which he has devoted his great abilities and his 'infinite capacity for taking pains,' is an event upon which Colonel Hanna himself, but also his countrymen in general, must be heartily congratulated. . . . In any case, the volume itself requires to be read, word for word, in order to be properly appreciated. It will, moreover, fully repay the most careful study."

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.—"Colonel Hanna, the ablest and the soundest of military writers on the Indian Frontier, has now . . . completed his work on the 'Second Afghan War.' For its political wisdom and the sureness of its technical judgments the book will take a high place in English military literature, and the last volume is the most interesting and absorbing of the three. . . . Few passages in our military history are so full of instruction and varied interest as the events between the first occupation of Kabul and the evacuation of Kandahar. There are several fine victories, some lucky ones, and the one serious defeat of Maiwand, a battle often described, but never so well as by Colonel Hanna now. . . . But Colonel Hanna's work is not merely a piece of military history. It has, as good military history should have,

rich political meaning. It is a deliberate and detailed dissection of the fallacies of the 'Forward Policy' and the search for the 'Scientific Frontier.'"

SCOTSMAN.—"In the third volume of his historical study of the events of the 'Second Afghan War,' Colonel Hanna successfully carries on, upon its established lines, a book already accepted as an authority by close students of the history of British India, and of the development of Indian Frontier Policy."

THE LIVERPOOL DAILY POST AND MERCURY.—"In Colonel Hanna the country possessed a soldier, and now possesses an historian the ablest and soundest of them all. Technical judgment, political wisdom, and utter fearlessness characterise every chapter of this vivid work, and although very many years are sped since the Afghan campaign was undertaken, the public are as liable to accept the rose-coloured official reports as ever; and men like the author are, indeed, the only safeguard they possess against political intrigues having for their object the subjugation of races we should do all in our power to strengthen and convert into friends and allies."

DAILY GRAPHIC.—"The impression made by the first two volumes, that the work would be a valuable contribution to the history of British rule in India, is confirmed by this, the concluding volume, which shows, as did the others, that Colonel Hanna was well fitted to deal with the complex problems, political and military, which beset our relations with the great and always perturbing Power on the North-west Frontier of India."

SIR HENRY COTTON IN "INDIA."—"Colonel Hanna is no mere historian of the events he describes. He took his part in them as an officer on the staff, and writes, therefore, from first-hand knowledge. We have in these pages a minute account of the vicissitudes of the campaign, illustrated by strategical maps of perfect lucidity and accuracy, and illuminated by observations recorded by the author from a military point of view, which award praise or blame with an almost icy impartiality."

WESTMINSTER GAZETTE.—"For the student of British military history there is in these three volumes a wealth of invaluable information, and if the work finds readers to anything approaching the number it deserves, it may be that the bitter experiences of the second Afghan War will not be wasted. . . . Every statesman, every soldier, and every politician owes it to his country that he should study with the utmost care Colonel Hanna's admirably written and most convincing pages."

NATION.—"But though we entirely agree with Colonel Hanna's political criticism . . . still his history is in the main a military work, and it will certainly become a text-book for the training of officers. . . . The present volume of this remarkable work is, on the whole, the most generally interesting, since it contains exact and dramatic accounts of the destruction of the Cavagnari Mission to Kabul, the siege of the cantonments of Sherpur just outside the city, the overwhelming disaster of Maiwand, and the marches between Kabul and Kandahar already referred to."

THE CALCUTTA ENGLISHMAN.—"Colonel Hanna certainly possesses the courage of his convictions and a thorough knowledge of his subject. His 'observations' are almost always pertinent and instructive. The historical part of the narrative is lucidly told, and perhaps nobody is better able than himself to handle the Afghan question. . . . The printing of the book is beautifully clear. The maps—there are nine of them in this volume alone—will contribute not a little to the value and importance of the work, and what also goes much in its favour is the fact that there are good indexes to each of the three volumes."

EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS.—"Colonel Hanna's history of the Afghan War is worth a whole series of books which claimed to tell the story of the more recent South African campaigns. It is lucid, informed, convincing, and plain to the ordinary reader in a sense that military books often are not. There are many plans and maps, while the clearness of the printing merits a word of appreciation."

CHURCH GUARDIAN.—"Colonel Hanna—a soldier of the intellectual type—can wield his pen exceedingly well, and his history of the 'Second Afghan War'—which now reaches its completion with this third volume—will undoubtedly take high rank in our military literature."

INDIA.—"The book (writes an Indian correspondent) is as interesting to a layman as to the military expert. It is full of lessons for the statesman in England no less than for the administrator on the Indian frontier. . . . Apart from the military and political interest of the book, its human side is full of pathetic lessons. The style throughout is admirably vigorous, and the personal narrative touching."

MANCHESTER COURIER.—"Colonel Hanna has, indeed, made a notable and valuable contribution to modern Indian history in the three volumes which tell the story of the 'Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80.'"

INVESTOR'S REVIEW.—"Colonel Hanna has now completed his excellent and authoritative history. . . . The third volume, now published, is the largest of the three, and in some respects the most fascinating; but the whole book is well and conscientiously written, packed with information, and suffused with political wisdom—a book, therefore, not only to be read, but to be bought and kept for reference."

WESTERN PRESS.—"The skill and intelligence which Colonel Hanna has shown in compiling such a masterful and heavy work stamps him as a man of brilliance, and the work should prove a valuable asset to political and military students.

MORNING LEADER.—"The third and final volume of Colonel Hanna's masterly history of the 'Second Afghan War.' . . . This well-planned and well-executed history (furnished, we may add, with excellent maps)should be the standard work on its subject."

DAILY NEWS.—"Colonel Hanna's work is one which reveals singular mastery of his subject, both on the military side and on the political."

NEW AGE.—"Written in good English, printed on good paper, and containing clear and adequate strategical maps . . . it is a book for all readers, from the soldier to the politician."

FREEMAN'S JOURNAL.—"The history has run into three volumes, and this is the last. It has been done with great elaborateness of detail. . . . This is a valuable book."

UNITED SERVICE GAZETTE.—"Colonel Hanna is an officer with considerable Indian experience. . . . He has been a determined opponent of the forward policy in India, and certainly the discouraging experience we have always met with in our trans-frontier wars shows that Colonel Hanna's premises are based on something more than theory, and that he is one of those keen, far-seeing soldiers who were capable of correctly gauging the results of our interference with Afghanistan, and of indicating that we were laying up a store of future trouble for ourselves."

TIMES.—"This work, an elaborate account of the operations for the strategist and military student, is now complete."

MILITARY MAIL.—"The opinions of the author, as expressed in the final chapter, are instructive and illuminating, and he ends a great work by the words, 'Progress founded on Peace.'"

OBSERVER.—"The concluding volume of a lucid, able, and authoritative work."

# INDIAN PROBLEMS

No. I. CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?
No. II. INDIA'S SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER—WHERE IS IT? WHAT IS IT?
No. III. BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS?

## OPINIONS OF THE PRESS

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.—"Colonel Hanna has given in a comparatively small space, and with admirable clearness, such a conspectus of recent frontier policy in India as can hardly be found elsewhere, and such a demonstration of its real meaning and too probable consequences as should have an effect, even at this eleventh hour, on every mind not obstinately closed against conviction."

SATURDAY REVIEW.—"These problems are all of the highest interest and importance; they dominate our foreign policy, both in Europe and Asia; while for our Indian Empire, their proper interpretation and decision involve the gravest issues of prosperity and safety, bankruptcy and ruin."

THE SCOTSMAN.—"Colonel Hanna's Indian Problem, 'Backwards or Forwards?' is quite as remarkable as his first and second for its strength of conviction, thorough knowledge of his subject, and force of reasoning. There seems to the inexpert reader no escape. He not only advances an opinion, but proves it almost like a proposition in Euclid."

THE DAILY GRAPHIC.—"Colonel Hanna has certainly collected a striking number of weighty utterances in favour of his main contention. That contention, briefly stated, is, that the Indian Government ought never to have advanced beyond the Indian Frontier at the foot of the mountains, and ought, as speedily as possible, to retire to that frontier.'

BROAD ARROW.—"Colonel Hanna may be satisfied that he has accomplished excellent and enduring work."

---

LONDON:
CONSTABLE & CO.
10, ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.



( V BBS )
106374




Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019